With the backdrop of an accelerating economic slowdown, the curtain has been raised for us to see the spectacle of two politicians paired by their ambition and weakness, ready to gather around them a set of secondary characters that believe their time has come to direct the show. They star in a play of difficult characterization that moves between the entanglement and the drama. What has little mystery is the outcome. It will end badly, even if not soon.
As the former president of the government and president of this foundation, José María Aznar, has stated, of the possible options, Sánchez has chosen the worst, not because he was forced to do so, but because that was his decision dictated, as always, by his pressures to maintain power –or at least the government– at any price, urged by the fiasco of the elections that he believed and made his party believe would reinforce his position. The first price paid by Sánchez and the PSOE is to wipe out any remaining credibility. It is not that Sánchez lied when he explained to us the insomnia that a government with Podemos would produce him, it is that simply for him the categories of truth or lie do not exist.
The other part of the price that the PSOE and Sanchez are willing to pay –and gladly, it should be added– is to bring the political system of the Constitution into its worst crisis, a crisis that their necessary allies expect and want to be terminal. And they have reason to think that they have never had it better in their project to dismantle the fabric of coexistence, unity and the rule of law on which Spain's democratic history has been woven since 1977. The Socialists have been assuming the belief that the Transition and the constitutional pact were badly done, hence their fondness for the often sectarian cultivation of historical memory, their equivocal game with the idea of a supposed plurinationality of Spain and their rapid tendency to question the democratic legitimacy of the adversary when he, as in the case of the PP, has proved capable of beating them at the polls. For nationalists and independentists– a difference that today only refers to the rhythms of their ambitions– the autonomic model is a stage already widely surpassed in their projects and Sánchez's weakness, aggravated after the elections, is an irresistible temptation to advance in his strategy of rupture.
As for Podemos, nothing indicates that he has changed his objectives, but what is clear is that his current attachment to what they call the "social articles" of the Constitution is strictly instrumental and tactical. We can be the left that still vindicates the rupture against the coexistence pact of the Constitution, which abandons the false right of self-determination and sustains an economic model that has never, anywhere, produced more than misery and regression. Those who will foreseeably form the government are united by their common challenge to the constitutional framework, and that will have consequences.
No one can seriously argue that this formula that the PSOE and Pedro Sánchez are going to apply will allow us to face the secessionist challenge in Catalonia, nor will it promote the reforms that the Spanish economy needs in times of crisis, nor will it make us stronger in Europe. In all these chapters, the approaching government will not have neutral effects, but will worsen Spain's position. And this consequence is more than likely to occur no matter how much the sellers of the new government resort to old tricks such as saying that ERC, whose leader is firmly condemned for sedition, is actually a very moderate group, or exhibiting the "minister-alibrium",  In this case, it seems that the role will correspond to the current Minister of Economy in office, as other well known ones were before, presumed guarantees of rigour and firmness in governments that curiously dragged Spain into its worst recession or that promoted the tripartite governments of socialists with independentists in Catalonia. Frankenstein compared to what seems to come will be a model of harmony.