The Atlantic Alliance 70 Years Later: From Reform to Rebuilding

FAES Foundation

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Ten years ago, FAES published a report on the state of the NATO alliance. Within the report, it was brought to light a serious deterioration after the loss of a direct nuclear threat which would have guaranteed a high level of strategic cohesion. The Alliance, as illustrated in the text, had passed from being a collective defense system to an international security organization, more concerned by projecting security within its own surroundings and in organizing peace missions. Without denying the importance of such developmental work, the report also maintained the importance of recuperating the focus that brought meaning to the Alliance, and as a result, the Organization, the instrument it was endowed to achieve its goals. In order to do so, proposed lines of action were insisted upon such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, the promotion of democracy, antimissile defense... as well as the revision of decision-making procedures.

A decade later, we find ourselves in a different situation, without doubt much more complex, in which NATO has not been able to define its place and function and in which internal differences generate a serious ‘wear and tear’, as well as an increasing lack of credibility. Seventy years later, the Alliance is weaker, at a time in which the Organization has, after undergoing a process of increased bureaucratization, stressed its vocation as a security-based one.

Can we accept this NATO as the new normal? Is it an acceptable result of its adaptation within a new period? Should we not aspire to a better Alliance? Furthermore, does it even make sense that NATO exists in the year 2019?

The Nature of the Alliance

Throughout history, states have come together against a common threat, establishing a common strategy in order to combat it. The very term, alliance, has been understood as such for centuries. Alliances have dissolved after the situations that brought them to be were overcome, as the Secretary of Foreign Office, Lord Palmerston, indicated March 1, 1848 during an intervention in the House of Commons,

“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”.

Alliances were fleeting, the result of joint crisis, and they came and went according to the superior interests of the State, interpreted and dictated by its political elites.

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Along the same line of such realist traditions, the following statement by the first Secretary General of the Organization, General Hastings L. Ismay, former British Chief of Staff during WWII, has been repeated a thousand times and is thus in need of interpretation. According to this veteran soldier, the objective of the Alliance was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. It is difficult to say more with so few words. The Soviet Union was a threat to the then Europe, liberated from the Third Reich, which could only be combated through a direct and definitive compromise by the United States. Germany was divided and it was a fundamental concern to guarantee that it did not yet again become a serious problem for European security. General Ismay was presenting the Alliance as a measure of circumstance, determined by the state of affairs and concrete goals. Its duration would depend upon, as such, the validity of those circumstances.

One may suppose that Lord Ismay was familiar with the North Atlantic Treaty, a foundational text for the Alliance, although he did not take very seriously its Preamble, a historical gem in International Relations:

“They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.”

The Treaty is not simply put forth as a gathering of states that felt threatened by the Soviet Union or even just worried about German rearmament. On the contrary, its focus is upon the establishment of a new order of which the Treaty would be an added instrument, following suit behind the Atlantic Charter, San Francisco Conference, and in parallel with the Bretton Woods agreements. This is the establishment of the Liberal Order, or Pax Americana, that allowed for the greatest period of development and welfare in history. This new order was not responding to a temporary crisis, but just the opposite—it was counting on its longevity. It is not surprising that the Soviet Union is not mentioned even once, because NATO’s objective reaches beyond mere containment.

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The ruins left behind by the Third Reich allowed for the recuperation of Immanuel Kant’s legacy, the great Prussian philosopher, by following the thought that peace would be guaranteed by liberty and democracy. From there, comes the open character to new members of the Treaty as well as the rejection of a simple Soviet initiative because, again, its objectives stretch far beyond that of military containment.

Since its very first founding moment, the Treaty has existed within two states of being: one realist, and the other idealist. We could argue that they are complementary, and they are in a lot of ways, but as time has passed, bringing with it another perspective, both its realist and idealist natures have seen their fair share of corrosion.

**Mission Accomplished**

The Alliance accomplished its objectives. The United States left behind its isolationist traditions and promised to defend the signatory countries, especially Western Europe. That promise brought with it security, and reinforced the continental integration process, facilitating the economic reconstruction of the Old Continent. Without that security it is difficult to imagine constitutional democracy taking root in a European society founded in the middle classes. A confident Europe rejected Soviet influence while nuclear deterrence was able to contain a direct threat from Moscow. Germany was split in two for decades. The Federal Republic integrated itself within new regional organizations, all the while plainly assuming democratic and European values. Germany converted itself from that of a problem, into one of the new, although divided, pillars of Europe.

The project, overcoming the sad legacy of two World Wars through the establishment of a New World Order, came to be. NATO was just one of its many pillars along with the United Nations and World Trade Organization.
was fought in a different way by imposing a new weapon in order to finally reach victory. The Berlin Wall was knocked down and the enemy collapsed, ending the soviet experience in Russia and the other states that had fallen within its orbit. The European and Central Asian map was redefined, allowing for a new era to begin. While the Cold War lasted, the Liberal Order imposed itself as a reference on the planet. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, its consolidation followed. Along came the “unipolar moment” and the misleading “end of ideologies”.

As much as in its realistic as its idealistic versions, NATO had accomplished its objectives. It was, without a doubt, the most successful alliance in history, as it did not have to enter in combat in order to win. It was an extraordinary exercise of diplomacy and military strategy led by the United States, the superpower that knew how to configure a new order and characterize an age.

**Adaptation to New Surroundings**

Having accomplished all of its objectives, did it make sense to maintain the Alliance? In those days, few doubted its maintenance. From the judicial standpoint, the Treaty did not identify one or more enemies, but instead the defense of democratic values. As a result, its permanence seemed coherent. The member states considered that the Organization was active. Those who were not members strived to be so, convinced that national interests were upheld better from within than from without. This was especially true for those states that had been under soviet influence, some who had been obligated to enter into the Warsaw Pact, or those that had lost their sovereignty under the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For them, their sovereignty was best guaranteed under the umbrella of the Alliance.

Russia was no longer a threat, but instead a problem that brought with it risks and challenges. Without a direct and credible threat, the Alliance lost its cohesive nucleus and stopped being a system of collective defense, but instead, as mentioned earlier, transformed itself into a system of security. The focus was not on defending a community of nations, but instead in projecting security within its surroundings. What then followed was the moment of “Preventative Diplomacy”, and of association and cooperation. Little by little, its culture and strategic discipline was diluted so as to put more emphasis on diplomacy.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated:

“At the strategic level, the greatest evolution in NATO over the last two decades is the transition from a static, defensive force to an expeditionary force – from a defensive alliance to a security alliance. This change is a result of a new security environment in which threats are more likely to emanate from failed, failing, or fractured states than from aggressor states;
where dangerous, non-state actors often operate from within nations with which we are not at war, or from within our own borders; and where weapons proliferation and new technologies make possible the specter of chaos and mass destruction in any of our capitals.”

Progressively, new states were incorporated into the Alliance. This was evidence of its success after the break-up of the USSR and the end of the Warsaw Pact. Also, it represented the “Open Door” principle established in the Treaty. Just as it reassured democratic regimes, the Organization was also open to new states that shared in its principles and values. But its expansion also supposed a greater challenge: How would it maintain its operability with such a high number of members,

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Without a direct and credible threat, the Alliance lost its cohesive nucleus and stopped being a system of collective defense and transformed itself into a system of security especially as they had such different pasts and interests, all the while within the absence of a strategic threat? From its beginning, the United States had been able to use NATO as an extraordinary diplomatic instrument in order to exercise international influence. Along with expansion, this tool seemed to have the potential of becoming even more important. Still, that did not happen. The same lack of cohesion mentioned earlier and failings in the decision-making process brought about growing difficulties so that the Organization could not maintain its central role.

Old problems resurfaced within the new political environment. The debate over national contributions had been a constant since Cold War years. From the beginning, some European states concluded that the agreed monetary investment by conventional means brought with it an unacceptable risk because stopping the advance of soviet divisions implicated the destruction of their own countries. Under the circumstances, what did victory mean? For Europeans, the impending nuclear threshold reinforced deterrence as an effective policy and guaranteed their survival. After the Cold War, new arguments surfaced to reduce defense spending. Why maintain the effort if there was no immediate threat? Europe had gotten over the derived tensions of a middle-class struggle and nationalism thanks to the creation and development of the “Social Welfare State”. The State assumed responsibilities beyond those of sovereignty, those which before had been designated as those of an individual’s, like healthcare, pensions, education, unemployment… As such, the idea was to guarantee the security of families and reduce the pull of radical ideologies. The Welfare State played a critical role in how democracy took root in post-war Europe, but after the Cold War it was evident that this came at a high cost, exacerbated by the irresponsible behaviour of those political forces that maintained a chronic deficit. Military spending did not translate into votes, while showing sensibility for social problems and promising an even greater public intervention, did. The result was a “capabilities gap” between its members, that manifested itself during the Balkan Crisis. Also, the presence of technologies on the battlefield corresponded to different generations, which created a serious problem of interoperability.

Both the Clinton and Bush administrations were convinced of the importance for the United States, as well as for the Western World, of adapting NATO to the new strategic environment, one that required both the modernization of its capabilities and the designation of its role within the new international stage. They exerted
pressure so that the member states spent more on defense, so that problems of interoperability were overcome, and the Alliance recuperated its condition as a credible, collective system of defence.

“The problem is not just underfunding of NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO and national defense budgets have fallen consistently – even with unprecedented operations outside NATO’s territory over the past five years. Just 5 of 28 allies achieve the defense-spending target of 2 percent of GDP”.

“These budget limitations relate to a larger cultural and political trend affecting the alliance. One of the triumphs of the last century was the pacification of Europe after ages of ruinous warfare. But, as I’ve said before, I believe we have reached an inflection point, where much of the continent has gone too far in the other direction. The demilitarization of Europe – where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it – has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st. Not only can real or perceived weakness be a temptation to miscalculation and aggression, but, on a more basic level, the resulting funding and capability shortfalls make it difficult to operate and fight together to confront shared threats”.

After the attacks in New York and Washington DC on September 11, the U.S. critically reviewed its National Security Strategy and concluded that there was a necessity to curb the roots of Islamic Fundamentalism through profound changes in the depths of Islamic societies as a whole. Consequently, the Bush Administration proposed a strategy to his associates in the Atlantic Alliance, to be developed over decades, to bring about the end of Islamic Fundamentalism, awakening memories of times past. From the Churchill-like reference from the Secretary of State Rice in Cairo...

“We should all look to a future when every government respects the will of its citizens – because the ideal of democracy is universal. For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East – and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people”.

…to the actual foundations of “The Greater Middle East Initiative”, it was concluded that the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, just as communism, would only be

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4 (Ibid.)
5 Rice, Condoleezza. Remarks at the American University in Cairo. 20 de Junio de 2005.
defeated by the strengthening of democracy and the consolidation of the middle-class. In order to do so, it would be necessary to create a large fund in order to finance developing joint policies so as to guarantee the transformation: education, women, domestic markets, regional markets, health... The precedent put forth by the Marshall Plan was ever-present, as well as the differences between post-war Europe and the MENA region. The lack of good will from some governments in the region to even reach objectives asked of them, as well as the risk that high corruption rates would result in a misdirection of funds, brought about the consideration of mechanisms that guarantee a link between the reaching of objectives and access to funds, as well as a greater control over the use of such funds.

The new strategy, if accepted, would have entailed a coherent vision for NATO to develop over decades. Apparently, it would overcome the cracks that had been opening since the break-up of the USSR. Nonetheless, its acceptance was very limited. In the American Senate, many rejected such an intense involvement of the United States within a region of the planet considered to be so untrustworthy. The objectives were too ambitious. In Europe, the perspective was different. For the Chancellors of the Old Continent, what the White House was proposing was a monumental exercise of neocolonialism, that conflicted with the public’s view about former policies in these regions decades earlier. Public opinion would not accept it. Also, the commitment that was asked of them went far beyond their possibilities. It would be extremely difficult to forge a parliamentary consensus necessary in order to develop the strategy within a prolonged timeframe, in the same way as during the Cold War. On the other hand, for many, Islamic Fundamentalism was not so much an international threat as an interior security threat, that required changes in the orientation of the intelligence community and police force, as well as a greater coordination between states. From that point of view, NATO was not the right instrument to be used to tackle the issue.

On this occasion, the emergence of Islamic Fundamentalism as a threat did not generate a shared strategy, weakening even further the cohesion of the Alliance. The campaign in Afghanistan bared witness to how allied solidarity transformed into a tangled mess of caveats, guaranteeing disorder and inefficiency. Iraq only demonstrated even more differences between member states. NATO had entered into a crisis that many began to openly discuss.

The emergence of Islamic Fundamentalism as a threat did not generate a shared strategy, weakening the cohesion of the Alliance. The campaign in Afghanistan bared witness to how allied solidarity transformed into a tangled mess of opinions with reservations.
In American terminology, the campaign in Iraq was developed by a “coalition of the willing”. After that moment, the Bush Administration began to use the expression as an example to follow, at the expense of the Atlantic Alliance. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld commented on television that:

“There is no coalition. There are multiple coalitions... Countries do what they can do. Countries help in the way they want to help... And that’s the way it ought to work. I’ll tell you why. The worst thing you can do is to allow a coalition to determine what your mission is.”

Secretary of State Powell insisted that the new threat required a

“coalition of coalitions that are constantly ... shifting and changing as the needs shifted and changed.”

A source from the State Department admitted that

“We’d ‘ad hoc’ our way through coalitions of the willing, That’s the future, ... We are focusing on the enduring dynamics of coalition warfare”.

NATO’s Operative Plan was no longer an instrument. In the future, a permanent Alliance was not sought after, but instead ad hoc coalitions where powers with affected interests came together to act collectively.

While North American elites accepted as inevitable their distancing from Europe, because of a lack of common strategic vision and a serious and credible compromise on the part of the states of the Old Continent, Europeans rediscovered a preoccupation for security, even as it took a different form due to their geographic situation.

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The Eastern Front. Russia, the Intimate Enemy

Russia is NATO’s largest neighbor as well as the neighbor with the greatest military capacity. It is a revisionist actor that insists upon its status as a great power and, as such, it is the main external threat to the Alliance. Russia’s behavior is the result of three main factors:

1. Moscow considers the old agreements with the former soviet states to dismantle the Union in 1991 as unfavorable to its national interests and security;

2. the international order created and led by the United States post-Cold War does not recognize the corresponding status of Russia as a superpower;

3. they have failed in their attempt at creating a post-imperial Russian National Identity.

For the Atlantic Alliance, Russia is an “intimate enemy”, perfectly identified in military terms. Russian security and defense premises have not changed in the last five centuries. Even while Russia is a threat to the Alliance, for the Kremlin this means the opportunity to recuperate its status as a superpower. There are several types of Russian threats for NATO, although they are intertwined. NATO is confronted by the following:

1. stopping possible Russian aggressions along Eastern frontier countries (from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea),

2. stopping or responding to possible Russian cyberattacks on member states (like the one against Estonia in 2007),

3. stopping or responding to Russian hybrid wars,

4. adapting to the consequences of the suspension of the INF Treaty between the U.S. and Russia, and

5. responding to the increase in Russian militarization and activity in the Arctic region.

The Russian threat resulted in an impetus on the part of NATO. It strengthened the political treaty between member states about the necessity to guarantee its Eastern borders, improving the Alliance’s capabilities.
The Russian annexation of Crimea and the following invasion of the Southeast of Ukraine in 2014 forced the allies to strengthen their defenses, although slowly. Two NATO Summits (Wales 2014 and Warsaw 2016) were required in order to articulate policy and defense against Russia. They had to refamiliarize themselves with the idea of defending their own territory. The Russian threat resulted in an impetus on the part of NATO. It strengthened the political treaty between member states when dealing with the necessity to guarantee its Eastern borders, improving the Alliance’s capabilities—duplicating the possibility of rapid reaction, establishing the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and incrementing defense spending to that of 2% GDP for 2024. Still, on the ‘other side the coin’ of internal consensus, two fundamental problems within the Alliance come to the surface, already outlined within our first report in 2005: its inability to define its purpose of being within its new international environment and consequently the profound strategic divergence between state members.

Which policy to follow regarding Russia divides the allies. The perception of Russia as a military threat is quite different for different member states. It depends upon the geographic proximity of Russia and the historical experience for those Eastern European countries that were part of the Russian and Soviet empires. There exists many a disagreement over the permanency of NATO military bases along its Eastern borders. At the moment, as established by the NATO-Russia Founding Act NATO (1997) and the NATO-Russia Council (2002), their presence is set up on a rotation basis. Nevertheless, the decision of the U.S. to establish six military bases in Poland (August 2019) brings to light the relevance and importance of the debate, while at the same time reinforcing American strategic support towards Eastern European countries.

NATO needs to develop an integral, long-term strategy in respect to Russia based on unity, deterrence and resistance. The Alliance has to avoid a new Cold War with Russia by developing a policy founded on two pillars: dialogue and firmness. In order to do so NATO’s Strategic Concepts from 2010 need to be revised, as it was agreed upon within a geostrategic environment quite different from that of today. The documents out of the NATO-Russia Founding Act NATO (1997) and the NATO-Russia Council, were born of a cooperative spirit between Russia and the Alliance and do not reflect the actual state of relations, so that they should be re-
vised, without losing sight of the fact that they represent the only institutional framework to establish dialogue. Country members should maintain economic sanctions until Russia abandons Ukrainian territory, and likewise maintain their rotating military presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

NATO expansion is one of the major pitfalls for relations between Russia and the West. Despite complaints from Russia, the Alliance should remain faithful to its ‘open door’ policy, just as articulated in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. Nonetheless, in hindsight of the expansion of the last twenty years, priority should be given to the Alliance’s consolidation before further inclusion of new members.

Deterrence should cover an ample spectrum against the threats towards NATO, from nuclear to conventional, even hybrid. The Alliance is familiarized with nuclear and conventional deterrence. Nonetheless, the necessary deterrence against hybrids is much more complex than that of a traditional nature, which consist in demonstrating an attacker’s incapacity to reach one’s objectives and increment applicable punishment for each attack. Hybrid tactics defy both forms of deterrence.

Hybrid war and cyberattacks are closely linked. Both have been designed to be ambiguous in order to protect the attacker from punishment and impede the identity of the perpetrator in the majority of cases. It is crucial that the Alliance define vulnerabilities in the area of hybrid war, as well as who leads the global effort to adopt traditional principles of deterrence in cyberspace. A good start has been made with the Alliance’s decision to apply, in the case of a serious cyberattack, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

In the Arctic region, Russia does not represent an actual specific threat. It sees itself as a great polar power, and it is as much in the Arctic area. It possesses the greatest territory, sea, population and military presence in the region. The Kremlin has opted to prioritize the Arctic as a key area of effort in order to boost the Russian economy. Strong business investment, public and private, has been accompanied by an increase in territorial defense. The military installations from the Cold War era, previously abandoned, have been re-opened, and more frequent have been the encroachments, both aerial and submarine, in Arctic spaces that are within other countries’ territories and surroundings. The changes caused by the melting ice-caps (it is believed that by 2035 there will be no ice left in the Arctic during the summer, permitting boats to cross the North Pole) are a source of worry for many countries: not
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only the Arctic Council (Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Finland) and NATO. In this state of affairs, the Alliance should define what will be its future role in the region, since five of the eight countries in the Arctic Council are its members. The Arctic will continue to be a shared region, with a high level of regional cooperation between countries within the area. Nonetheless, it will also inevitably be turned into a theater of strategic competition between Russia and the allies, which means that countries that are not part of the Arctic region and have growing economic interests in the exploitation of its resources, like China, Japan or Singapore, will become involved. The main role of NATO in the Arctic should already center on the strengthening of regional order based on rules, support of regional cooperation and the betterment of its presence and military capability.

The Southern Front: Risks Derived from Instability

Russia divides the allies, but it is a recognizable threat, a state actor whose strategy is just as comprehensible as objectable. That is not the case on the Southern Front. Here we find ourselves with a group of states that suffer serious internal problems that affect their political stability and project serious tensions within their surroundings. The MENA region is quite large, and its issues varied. Those problems originating from their lack of stability are the following:

1. Islamic Fundamentalism arises in reaction to the general process of globalization that for many Muslims endangers the continuity of their culture. This is a reaction founded by insecurity and fear, as well as a rejection to the materialism and relativism that characterizes Western societies, as they have been leading said process until now.

2. Insufficient economic and social development, a result of a combination of elements which could be summed up by the following: elevated levels of corruption, the lack of educational systems that guarantee overall school attendance and access to quality upper-level education, the lack of judicial security, the lack of access to proper health systems, gender inequality...

3. A justified lack of faith in their governments brings sectors of the population, especially young people, to adopt political strategies that suppose regime change. While sectors of the highly educated are for democratization and a liberal econ-
omy, the less enlightened members of the population, without doubt greater in number, represent a vulnerable sector since Islamic Fundamentalists are even more so adept at gaining their support.

4. Predominant tensions between Iran and Arab powers are aggravated, generating inevitable effects over the Sunni and Shia communities within the region—a tension that carries with it an arms race and risk of nuclearization.

5. The rhythm of demographic growth is a burden on enterprise. Advances in healthcare have reduced newborn mortality rates, by-products of infections in mother and their children, while in many cases these countries have maintained large families in order to obtain a certain degree of social prestige or in order to have access to laborers. These are societies that have an average age less than that of thirty years, and in many cases, closer to twenty. Many young people, while different statistics vary from one country to the next, have not even received a basic level of education making them unable to access a workforce with specialized training.

The combination of these problems generates threats that can be termed as either isolated or combined. Political tension initiates cycles of revolution and repression, putting off foreign investors and condemning these countries to poverty. The masses of unprepared young people that try to find a future within economies lacking a certain dynamism, or those that simply find themselves within a state of violent unrest, are condemned to poverty and migration—that is if they do not opt for delinquency or Jihadism. If these states do not find a way to stabilize themselves and agree on a social consensus as to their development model, the region will continue to be submerged into a series of wars with the risk of provoking a conflict of even greater magnitude, all the while increasing both their migration towards Europe as well as their leaning towards Islamic Fundamentalism and Jihadism.

The situation in the Sahel region has its own characteristics. The states there are much weaker and less cohesive, their capacity to enforce order very limited, the demographic growth even greater and the possibility of developing a normal professional life frankly scarce. Sahel affects the MENA region by boosting just as much the operative capability of Jihadists and organized delinquency as the increase in migratory pressure.

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<td>4.7 5.3 9.9</td>
<td>19.3 23.0 29.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The instability on the Southern front means for the Alliance, especially for the states within the Mediterranean Basin, a serious irregular migrant pressure. In regards to the problems derived from migrant management can be added a partial failure to integrate, which exacerbates the issue and in part can lead to Jihadist attacks. This pressure would increase, to the point of turning into an unresolvable

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The stage set on the southern front is an uncomfortable one for NATO. There is no state actor in the region that can be considered an enemy. The threat comes from the effects derived from a structural disintegration of stability problem, if some key states of the region would collapse. This possibility cannot be discarded.

Muslim communities within member states of the Alliance participate in general debates of the Muslim world. Radicalization within their countries of origin affects them, especially within such sectors that they have not wanted to, or not known how to or have not been able to integrate, resulting in the treatment of the problem as a security issue. In recent years this has become one the greatest topics of political debate and as a result, changes in national political party systems.

If, as a consequence of internal tensions, some of the most important states in the region fell under the control of radical formations, it could pose a direct threat given that their military capabilities are comparable to some member states in the Alliance or, in the best of cases, they simply could become a source of tension. This could lead some of the member states to act preemptively or simply participate in regional conflicts in order to stop the advance of Islamic Fundamentalism.

### TABLE 2.
**Key Demographic Indicators of the 10 Countries of the Sahel, 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Annual Rate of Natural Increase (%)</th>
<th>Population density (persons per sq.km)</th>
<th>Total fertility rate (average number of children per woman)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Sudan does not include South Sudan.

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The stage set on the southern front is an uncomfortable one for NATO, especially for an Organization created precisely for the containment of direct security threats towards its member states. There is no state actor in the region that can be considered an enemy. The threat comes from the effects derived from a disintegration of stability that tends to be structural. Primarily, this a diplomatic and political challenge. Only if one is to act on its causes, will one be able to avoid its effects. The ambitious proposal presented by the Bush Administration did not ramp up enough support in either the United States or among the Allies. Policies followed by NATO and the EU are clearly insufficient. For Mediterranean states, the gravity of the situation is evident, just as its prolongation will be so in the future. These countries ask the Organization for more attention to be directed to it, afraid that more pressing necessities on the Eastern front will mean an abandonment in the South. Nonetheless, as an example of their incoherent manifest, these countries also stand out in their low investment in Defense capacity, and as a result, in the limited operability of their Armed Forces. If the most affected states do not address this serious situational evolution on the Mediterranean Meridional Coast themselves, improving and adapting their capabilities, it is understandable that their partners in the Alliance will focus their attention on Russia, a more comprehensible threat that can be contained or confronted.

This lack of common vision allows for limited action, stamped with a strong national emphasis and reminiscent of neocolonial times. In the best of cases, a group of members coordinate their capabilities in the taking of common action, normally directed towards the elimination of Jihadist groups and trying to strengthen state authorities—effective missions, but insufficient so as to confront the gravity of the situation.

The End of the Liberal Order

NATO is one of the organizations characterized as a “Liberal Order”, having taken part in the redesign of the international system after WWII under the leadership of the then emerging superpower: The United States. That “order” survived even the Great Depression and after the failure of the “unipolar moment”—of clear American hegemony—and through the mirage of the “end of ideologies” we have entered into a new era and, like all beginnings, its characteristic is disorder. There is no reason that the Alliance, forged from the ruins left behind by the Second World War and the founded fear of Soviet intentions, cannot endure within a different his-
torical framework, but the only sure thing is, in order to do so, a radical transformation must come to be.

Upon Barack Obama’s arrival in the White House, the United States started a strategic turn characterized by international withdrawal. An industrial and commercial power cannot isolate itself, but instead try to avoid being dragged along by foreign conflicts that do not serve its national interests. To what degree a crisis does or does not affect national interest is not always so easy to discern, especially when that decision tends to have ideological or subjective components. Withdrawal, during the Obama days, allowed China, Russia, Iran and Taliban militias to take advantage. With Trump, the United States has started a Trade War with China and a change in Iranian policy that will cause sensitive damage to both countries, and in the case of China, global trade as a whole. Nevertheless, if one is to eye the ‘blueprint’ of Security and Defense, the actual continuity, from that of the former administration along into the new one, is greater than what one would believe given the vociferous style of the actual president. As a result, the same powers, those that were able to benefit from a swing in policy imposed by Obama, continue to do so today. If the rival or enemy is conscious that the United States will do everything possible in order to avoid using force, the diplomatic capacity of the United States will continue suffering a continual decline. The tension between the defense of national interest and the political compromise in its promise to avoid being trapped in new and long-lasting conflicts will continue devouring high-level civil servants while American credibility diminishes. The deterrence capacity of a tweet or bullying is rather limited, especially in the face of age-old powers.

American international withdrawal has taken hold in the White House and on Capitol Hill, but the way in which to implement it draws stark divisions within both parties. The United States is returning to its authentic diplomatic tradition, abandoning the Truman era impetus, founded on the Liberal Order. But it is far from arriving at a consensus over what should be its role in the world and how to achieve it.

Regarding the inherited past problems of the Alliance, which we have mentioned, added are those that have derived themselves from an emerging world characterized by globalization and the Fourth Industrial Revolution. If the Alliance was born with a regional vocation, its destiny lies in its acceptance of global responsibilities, or else, its irrelevance.

It does not seem to be the moment to open up a strategical debate that could make it even more evident a lack of common vision
In this new setting, China has demonstrated its vocation as a great power, from a different point of view. After not having taken part in the three first industrial revolutions, the political regime has made its industrial strength a pillar on which to support its power and stability. Even so, its lack of respect for patents and foreign research, its aggressive trade strategy, the intimate relationship between its regime and its “national champions”,...have converted the great Asian power into a problem for the rest of the world and a definite threat towards the economic order. Its behavior respecting the sovereignty of territories is in dispute, its interest in the control of the 5g network, and the use of its technology for political and security ends has generated a lack of trust as well. In the immediate future, this mistrust will increase as a consequence of quantic computers and their relation to Artificial Intelligence, terrains that China explores ever so conscious of the fact that cybernetics have demonstrated their “dominance” at the beginning of the 21st century, within both domestic and international spaces.

A new rivalry between great powers characterize the start of the century, together with the already mentioned effects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Our security concept evolves towards the realization that we find ourselves in a permanent state of conflict with states with which we maintain all types of intense relations.

“A paradigm shift in the nature of conflict that many in the West are yet to understand. 21st century war is, and will likely continue to be, a war of all against all in which everyone, from States to all kind of non-states actors, can be a player and everything can be weaponised. Hybrid threats or conflict in the grey area are about just that: ambiguity, deniability, activity below the threshold of response, etc. But it is important to bear in mind that hybrid should be understood as an all-encompassing umbrella which, obviously to me but not to everyone, includes traditional kinetic warfare as well. The immediate threat may not be to our physical existence, but rather to the society based on liberal democratic values- which we treasure”3.

3 “The West is yet to understand the paradigm shift in the nature of conflict in the 21st century” An interview with Chris Donnelly, director of The Institute for Statecraft by Nicolás de Pedro, Associate Fellow at the Instituto de Política Internacional Apunte. Instituto de Política Internacional.
Amidst this new setting we realize that those that led the construction of the Liberal Order, today have assumed that it has an expiration date, and are actively participating in its demolition.

“In recent years, trade actions by US president Donald Trump have gradually transformed the world’s free trade system into one of managed trade, focusing on outcomes rather than being rule-based. Measures such as tariffs, quotas (to escape tariffs), commitments to buy, and export and investment controls are becoming normal. The narrative has also widened from trade war to industrial policy war — efforts to promote certain high-tech sectors to become globally dominant.

(...) Basically, the US has used trade, financial, economic, legal and regulatory tools to weaken national champions supported by China. The motivation for doing so has moved beyond commercial and economic reasons to national security and strategic concerns.

(...) Recently, it has been argued that the attempt to weaken foreign competitors is not enough — because tariffs alone are unlikely to bring back manufacturing jobs — and that the US and the west must follow China’s example and implement the “positive” side of industrial policy: supporting domestic companies to compete and prevail internationally.

(...) China’s social and economic system has created an uneven playing field favouring Chinese companies in competition with their western counterparts, both domestically and internationally. Engaging in a race against China in this space and in this manner means the west risks becoming more like China, rather than the reverse, as Henry Kissinger might have hoped.

While China is practising socialism with Chinese characteristics, the west appears to be gradually embracing capitalism with Chinese characteristics! If this pans out, China will have won the ideological war”10.

If the Bush and Clinton administrations endeavoured to revive the Atlantic Alliance, the Trump and Obama administrations demonstrated a rather pessimistic vision about its future. Within the blueprints for Security and Defense bilateral relations in the conceptual framework of “alliances of the willing” was opted for. At the same time, NATO evolved into a condition of diplomatic influence. The Alliance has been lacking in strategy for a while now, divisions from within are profound and it does not appear that this situation can be overcome any time soon. In these circumstances there exists an unspoken agreement, one in which it is considered not to be the moment to open up a strategical debate that could make it even more evident a lack of common vision. Seemingly, it would be better to accept an

10 Hung Tran, “Industrial policy war — capitalism with Chinese characteristics. The west is at risk of losing the ideological war”. Financial Times, 21.09.2019.
In an increasingly uncertain world, the coming together of democratic states, engaged with the rule of law and the respect for human rights, provides security for its citizens from the ground up and tranquillity for its leaders.

Anachronic concept as opposed to a failure after having confronted something new. We are not before a division caused by antagonist visions, but instead before a state of decomposition. The most recent milestones: the end of missile control agreements, the North American abandonment of the nuclear agreement with Iran, policy towards China...they have done nothing more than exacerbate the differences between different partners and bring to light the lack of cohesion in the heart of the Alliance. An international organization can survive without a clear com-

**Graph 2.**
**In many NATO member countries majorities approve of the alliance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median</strong></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

mitment and even more so when many states consider it advantageous to form part of it as opposed to just be near it. Even so, an alliance needs to be credible, beyond what the treaties suggest.

The Alliance and the Organization are supported by public opinion. In an increasingly uncertain world, the coming together of democratic states, engaged with the rule of law and the respect for human rights, provides security for its citizens from the ground up and tranquillity for its leaders. That is a positive start for the Alliance in order to adjust itself within a new strategic environment.

Nevertheless, the degree of distrust in respect to North American leadership has no precedent since the Treaty was signed. The “in” from General Ismay’s formula (“to keep...the Americans in”) was not solely in reference to the military “capabilities” of the United States. The key was that solely the United States, then like now, could assume and exercise leadership. For while all countries which signed the allied contract were equal judicially, some are more powerful than others within the political arena. Instead, the management of the Afghan crisis, Iraqi and Syrian, characteristically military, have demonstrated limits to the North American leadership, as a result of differences on Capitol Hill regarding the future role of the United States in the world, and consequently, its difficulty in maintaining a strategy long-term. These three crises have resulted in failure, and gravely damaged the reputation of the United States in respect to its allies.

Since the Great Depression, the European states, although some more than others, went through a period in which they experienced fiscal revenue losses and at the same time a greater necessity for spending in order to alleviate problems derived from the increase in unemployment. Consequently, the member states shunned, and now continue to shun, their commitments to increase Defence expenditure to a level that allows the maintenance of a proper operability and necessary refurbishing of their military capabilities. As a result, North American elites criticize the usefulness of an Alliance in which its members lack necessary capabilities, systematically do not follow through with their commitments and do not seem to modify such behaviour short-term. The Organization remains useful from a diplomatic perspective, not military.

The European defense initiative is rooted in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), but its absence was highlighted after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom.
GRAPH 3.
Defense expenditure. Share of GDP, 2018 estimates (%)

Iceland has no armed forces.

* According to NATO definition. ** Have either national laws or political agreements that call for at least 2% of GDP to be spent on defence annually, consequently these estimates are expected to change accordingly.

Sources: NATO, IISS military Balance
European Defense: A Limited Project

Clearly, the international order is entering a period of Power Politics, within an uncertain geopolitical context. Presently, and in the near future, the competitiveness between China, the United States and Russia, along with Iran, will pose new questions in the field of security and defense. The ever-changing threat of Islamic Fundamentalism, embodied in terrorist acts, will persist in its catalyzing role of instability within the equilibrium of power.

The worst problem facing the EU is that it does not exist as a State, but neither does it as a strategic actor that can defend itself among superpowers. According to the numbers (GDP, trade balance, the number of soldiers in national standing armies), the EU is a giant; in regards to the weight it wields in world affairs, it is dwarf. As a result, it is not surprising that public debate has intensified about its defense, its military industry and the European Military.

The European defense initiative is rooted in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), but its absence was highlighted after the annexation of Crimea by Russia (March 2014) and the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom (June 2016), which means more than just a loss of cohesion within the EU and decrease in its military capacity. In June of 2016, The European Union Global Strategy was published, a document that acknowledges an EU’s future as threatened.

In order to comprehend the initiative within that of the formation of European defense, the European military Industry and the European Army, one must first understand the difference between the terms ‘defense of Europe’ and ‘European defense’. Since the very foundation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, the defense of Europe was NATO’s task, and it still is.

European Defense

‘European defense’ is a concept first touched upon in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) adopted by the European Council if Maastricht, in 1992, with the idea of giving the member states an institutional framework in order to create in-
struments of common strategy, foreign policy and common defense. With this in mind, The Lisbon Treaty (2010) created the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). PESCO’s purpose was to allow the denominated ‘European defense’, as a part of The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), to progress, by the very hand of the countries most interested and ready to do so—those that wanted and could—and to cooperate with each other. The designed regime within Protocol 10 of the TEU had set forth the objective to elevate the grade of ambition of ‘European defense’ surpassing the level of assessed foreign security missions included within the Treaty in order to achieve, and if in agreement, a true PCSD. As such, it was clear that whatever collective defense within the margins of NATO was impossible.

The reactivation of European defense followed a series of particular events. Among them, are the negative consequences of the 2008 economic Crisis in relation to defense budgets, the progressive withdrawal of American forces deployed within European spaces, Brexit, geopolitical instability within Europe’s surroundings and the Trump Administration’s political outlook towards NATO and its European allies.

The reactivation of European defense was guided by the Franco-German impetus because both countries recognized the necessity of reinforcing their military capacity in order to respond to immediate strategic challenges and mobilize NATO’s collective capabilities and that of the EU. Within the Atlantic framework, both countries discarded the idea that the EU should develop a defense apart from that of NATO. The mutual understanding between France and Germany was decisive in revitalizing the collaboration between the EU and NATO.

A little known, but necessary, fact about the Franco-German impetus is that of the role of the Commission, as it has been insisting upon placing the CDSP in the centerstage of European defense. The behavior of the Commission does not solely have to do with the industrial scope that already forms part of its capabilities, but instead upon the creation of a European Army, to develop PESCO, reinforce CSDP and support the European Defense industry and markets, all supported by its president, Jean-Claude Juncker, before and after his election.

We are facing the beginning of a new era and we are running the risk that the Atlantic Alliance, one of our principle actors, be assigned a secondary role
In order to give a boost to its objectives, the European Commission put forth its own vision of European defense with its own tools of influence. As such, in consideration are three stages reflected within its June 2017 document.

1. First is the cooperation between Security and Defense, where the member states would collaborate on a case by case basis, taking charge of operations and common capabilities while maintaining EU-NATO cooperation within the actual format.

2. Member states would combine determined military means and financial resources, while the EU would take charge of areas such as cyber, border protection, and terrorism, increasing collaboration between the EU and NATO.

3. Within the third stage, that of security and common defense, PESCO would allow for a group of states to take European defense to the next level, sharing responsibilities with NATO over territorial defense and completing high-intensity military operations.

In order to launch such an evolution, the Commission put together a Defence Package that includes financial and regulatory tools in order to develop a European military industry.

A European Military Industry

Since the end of the Cold War, countries within the EU insisted upon investing in “peace dividends” regarding social welfare, neglecting their defense. Using NATO as a platform, the United States brought to light this circumstance time and time again, without success. At the same time that a digital revolution was coming to be, Europe missed a beat and its defense industry began a path towards obsolescence.

Budget cuts within the last decade have only maintained an industrial status quo which have not benefitted competitive capabilities of European companies and have meant a delay in the decision-making process over investment and linked technological activities. Furthermore, there has been a troubling technological delay that translates into serious difficulties, industrial as well as military.
One of the main objectives of the European military industry is the intent to reduce excess capacity, better interoperability, increment investment in new technologies and streamline costs, avoiding duplicates that reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the whole of the European military system. In order to do so, the European Commission initiated the Defence Action Plan (EDAP) and the European Defence Fund (EDF).

The EDAP is founded in coherence with four instruments:

- The European Defence Fund (EDF), whose object is the financing, on the part of the Commission, of technological research projects and the development of military capabilities.

- The promotion of investment in supply chains, emphasis on the role of SMEs, in order to better their access to financing as well as markets and improve compatibility of the European defense sector along the entire production chain.

- The reinforcement of one market, in order to boost the establishment of communitarian rules in the defense market, which in general terms is guided by factors that are missed by the competition.

- The reinforcement of communitarian policies, so that its defense is included within other transversal policies such as space or cybersecurity.

The European Defence Fund is the primary pillar within the plan and embodied within two divisions. One is oriented towards research and the other towards the acquisition of capabilities. The fund has a thirteen-billion-euro budget which should be sufficient in order to promote businesses, research centers and universities, and defense ministries—through joint financing—so as to become closer to what is a European defense market. In order to take advantage of the Fund’s opportunities, a precise means of the joint financing of projects, for those whom are interested in participating, is necessary. Without such means, no one could participate and the return percentage on each investment from each member state could be lost. This fact brings to light the possible construction of an oligopoly by the French and German companies (the locomotors of the project) within the European defense industry.
Regarding the participation of third countries within the EDF, the question is more complex. The initial approach of the EU, in the EDF and in PESCO, is orientated towards the production of those European countries’ industries, as much as in the access to financing as to the generation and protection of technologies. Even so, the necessity of closing the technological gap implies either an elevated amount of resources applied in a short period of time, generating a technological jump of more than a decade (highly unlikely), or taking advantage of outsider technologies in order to not repeat processes and therefore guide resources towards the innovation generation.

The connection between NATO and PESCO should be of a complimentary nature, in which it is reflected the industrial capabilities to consider in the heart of the EU that should then respond to NATO’s strategy.

The defense industry has to strengthen itself and be more efficient than what it has been up until now. The prioritization of European projects, each with their own depths and complexities, together with the development of policies based on clear strategies, will be the necessary conditions to set up future fundamentals for the industry.

**A European Army**

The project to create a European Army is not that precise, considering that it has no operability. There is not even a European military academy, nor European units of military operations.

The initiative to create a European defense is inseparable from the creation of a common strategic vision, all the while upholding a complementary character towards NATO.

**Conclusions**

The Atlantic Alliance is a historic milestone of International Relations and International Public Jurisprudence. We can feel proud of the role it has served in the defense of its state members’ sovereignties regarding the containment of the Soviet

The role that is today being developed by the United States is extremely damaging to the maintenance of the transatlantic link because of how it involves both unilateralism and nationalism
threat and a modern-day reconfiguration of the world. It is one of the pillars that
the Liberal Order rose upon, a source of progress and a guarantee to liberty. Even
so, that Order has been overwhelmed. We are facing the beginning of a new era and
we are running the risk that the Atlantic Alliance, one of our principle actors, be as-
signed a secondary role.

All periods of change suppose a greater risk. Now, more so than previous
decades before, we need the Alliance in order to guarantee our safe passage
through an international society at its birth. As mentioned before, that will not be
possible if we do not seriously consider its refoundation. We would like to insist
upon the following necessary steps:

1. We need to accept the reality of a period change with inevitable consequences
regarding principles, categories, doctrines and organization. We can be com-
fortable with what we have but that would be misleading.

2. Are we still a community? Without doubt we were, but to what degree are we still?

3. According to the hypothesis in which we believe we are a community, we should
consider a strategy so as to shape together a new order, amidst the reality of
globalization and the effects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The Alliance
would again be one of its pillars, the primary warden for our security. The role
that is today being developed by the United States is extremely damaging to the
maintenance of the transatlantic link because of how it involves both unilater-
alism and nationalism.

4. If, on the contrary, we conclude that elements of cohesion are weak and the
challenge put forth by the shaping of a new order should be achieved solely by
each of the states and regional organizations, we should ask ourselves if the Al-
liance, from a realist perspective, still makes sense. It would no longer be one
of the pillars of the New Order, but instead simply a base for our security.

5. The Alliance is only possible if its leadership is headed up by the United States
and today that possibility is in question because of a lack of authority. If a strate-
getic consensus is not achieved in Washington, so as to allow for stability within
its foreign policy, the Alliance will fall apart.

The Alliance will not be able to survive without a new and
credible Strategic Concept that brings together a combination
of risks and threats and proposes viable alternatives that are
sufficiently distributed among members.
6. The Alliance will not be able to survive without a new and credible Strategic Concept that brings together a combination of risks and threats and proposes viable alternatives that are sufficiently distributed among members. Adaptation towards the new technological environment is fundamental, especially where permanent conflict and the instruments of aggression are not of the ordinary kind.

7. The Alliance is fiction without military capability or interoperability, which could result in a ‘spill over’ effect into the national defenses of the member states. Either Defense Expenditure turns back from the course it is on or this entire critique has no meaning. The Alliance would vanish simply as the result of a sort of truancy on all sides.

The Organization has a guaranteed comfortable, and secondary, role within the international stage, but that is not the case when one considers the Alliance. The Treaty, and its judicial experience, can endure over time, but its system of collective defense cannot. Without a common strategy, the Alliance will gradually fade away. Ultimately, and in the worst of cases, by the sending of a simple telegram filled with heartfelt condolences, any member state will have complied with its commitments.