The report *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom* was first published in 2005. It offered proposals to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance in a new strategic environment.

**NATO’S 60th ANNIVERSARY** is a perfect occasion to remember and update those proposals in sight of recent events: Barack Obama’s arrival in office, the steps taken by president Sarkozy, Russia’s political evolution, the constant threat of jihadist terrorism, Iran or North Korea’s persistent nuclear ambitions, and the situation in Afghanistan, are some of the issues analyzed in this new edition of *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom*. The proposals of the original report are still valid: strengthening and reforming NATO are essential requirements to guarantee our security and the future of freedom.
NATO:
AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM
How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies
October 20th, 2005

NATO is at a crossroads. It may choose the path of continuity, risking becoming marginal to the security needs of its members or, alternatively, as argued in this report, it could walk the path of strategic change.

It is our belief that NATO should take an ambitious jump if the organization wants to play a central role in strengthening the security of its members.

NATO was created in 1949 in order to defend the Free World, to preserve our freedom and democracies from the threat of totalitarianism. NATO reinvented itself during the last decade, moving from a Cold War collective defense arrangement to become a collective security organization concerned with stability in its periphery and focusing primarily on peace support operations. We believe that NATO must rethink itself again if it wants to remain a relevant producer of security for the Western World.

Nazism gave way to communism as an existential threat to western democracies. After living in a decade of a false peace, we, today, are facing a new existential threat, Islamist terrorism, as argued in this report, and NATO must give an answer to that. It has to fulfill our defensive requirements.
In the coming years NATO is going to debate its main purpose, and its enlargement to regions never thought before. The summits of 2006 and 2008 will revolve around those issues.

We, at FAES (Fundación para el análisis y los estudios sociales), wanted to make an initial contribution to the emerging debate. So this report touches upon the true nature, the strategic vision, the missions, the structures, and the membership of NATO. We are no longer living under benign conditions. On the contrary we must accept that.

Over a few months we gathered a group of experts, under the direction of Rafael L. Bardají, head of International Policy Studies at FAES, and Florentino Portero, executive secretary of GEES (Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos), to discuss and advance the ideas we consider to be the appropriate ones to put NATO on the right track. Despite all the operations carried out by NATO today, we believe the strategic divergence among its members is still deep and may condemn the organization if not properly addressed.

I’m convinced that this report lays out the foundations of a strengthened Alliance, one that serves, protects and defends its members and promotes and expands freedom. It is our freedom that is it at stake and NATO must do whatever is needed to defeat those who threaten it.

José María Aznar
President of FAES
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NATO was created in order to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of western nations. It was built upon the principles of democracy, individual liberties and the rule of Law, and as such is equally vital today. The Alliance was able to protect our freedom and democracies from the Soviet threat. Now it is imperative to defend them against Islamist extremism.

NATO is a successful organization. It peacefully won the Cold War against the threat of Communism and the USSR; it also managed to intervene in the Balkans, imposing by force its peaceful view there. It has been successful because it has always been capable of responding to any threat that has emerged, successful because the Alliance has played the important role of providing a collective system against common threats. Thanks to NATO, each member nation was relieved of the need to act alone, finding in the Alliance the only effective multilateral institution which for years has defended their freedom.

However, today the Atlantic Alliance is immersed in what is probably the worst crisis in its entire history. In fact, there are two ways of understanding the current state of NATO and neither of them promises a better future. On the one hand, there are those who claim that the Alliance is clinically dead in its role as a military tool and instrument for collective action, given that the Alliance lost its raison d’être when the Soviet threat dissipated. 1989 not only marked the end of the East-West confrontation, but also the end of the military institutions on both sides. Refusing to recognize the profound geo-strategic changes that took place in the early 1990s and continuing as if nothing had happened would be tantamount to maintaining a zombie NATO, apparently alive on the outside, but dead on the inside. The ensuing divisions and incapacity to act collectively have been demonstrated in Iraq. Following the disappearance of the USSR, the United States, the only remaining superpower, would gradually drift away from its
European allies, being capable of defending its national interests on its own; at the same time, the Europeans would no longer need the Americans to provide a counterweight to a new Russia that posed no threat, seeking to gain greater decision-making autonomy and independence from Washington. Translated to the heart of NATO, these two structural tendencies would turn the organization into an arena of mutual recrimination and non-action.

There is a second view by which to consider the Alliance, one that is predominant today in official statements. Instead of NATO being dead, this view asserts the opposite, that in fact NATO is more active than ever. A new NATO has emerged, one forged during the 1990s, one that no longer focuses on deterring the Soviet threat, but on helping to export stability to other parts of the world through wide-ranging peace support operations, as witnessed in the Balkans and in a theater as distant from Europe as Afghanistan. And NATO could begin to play a role in other areas, such as Darfur, if its members so desire. The Alliance has developed from being an organization based on the collective defense of its members to an institution that ensures regional security with selective global ambitions.

Paradoxically, both perceptions are correct. NATO persists, but it is not the same NATO that existed before the 1990s. It has changed its orientation and its composition, as well as its structures. It has become something else under the same name, but it has not died. It is also true that NATO has never been involved in so many simultaneous operations as it is now. In fact, NATO had never deployed its forces outside the territory of its member countries before the mid-1990s. NATO never planned for this during entire decades and yet, today, it does nothing else.

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However, the growing and even feverish activity of NATO has not lessened the feeling that the golden age of the Alliance is a thing of the past and that the organization harbors a series of unresolved prob-
lems that could endanger its very existence at any time. The future of NATO relies on a more than fragile equilibrium.

In fact, those who state that NATO is more active today than ever before also admit that the organization has serious problems in the way it works, which makes it somewhat ineffective. It is as if the members, exhausted after years of mutual recriminations, had decided to promise anything in order to avoid greater political fall-out, knowing all along that they were not going to keep their word. This is why the decisions adopted by the members of the Alliance take so long to be implemented, if they are implemented at all. Within a context such as the Cold War, which was frozen by definition, the speed of reaction of NATO’s members was a question of secondary importance. Within a context in which it is necessary to place troops at the disposal of Allied command in order to carry out missions, political promises and commitments are no longer enough. The necessary forces must be drafted within a timescale that enables the corresponding plans to be implemented. This does not happen today at NATO, where summit meetings have become a mere sounding board for rhetoric and a stage for signing agreements that are hardly fulfilled.

It is within this context characterized by hyperactivity as well as a perpetual crisis that the debate regarding Atlantic Alliance reform and transformation has emerged. However, here we also find two visions regarding the direction that NATO should now pursue. On the one hand, many Europeans would prefer the Alliance to serve as a forum for consultation regarding the most important strategic issues of the moment. In fact, they would like NATO to become a forum for strategic dialogue between America and Europe, a role it does not play at the present time. On the other hand, the American allies in particular see a need for NATO to improve its military capacity and for the member countries to promote their armed forces, transforming them from relatively static armies to deployable and expeditionary forces.

The combination of these two ways of approaching the future of the Alliance –more political for some and more military-based for others– has resulted in a certain paralysis and a lack of will to tackle the reforms that are required. It is very difficult to transform the military capability of NATO’s members if there is no consensus regarding for what these new enhanced forces are needed; at the same time, it is impossible to make NATO a forum for strategic debate when the major-
ity of the organization’s members have a marginal role when it comes to contributing to joint measures or are just focused on their surroundings.

We effectively believe that NATO’s military capability is seriously deficient and that this deficiency must be remedied as soon as possible by the organization’s members if each country truly wishes to have an army at its disposal capable of providing an individual and collective response to the demands of the new strategic environment. However, we are also convinced of the fact that the worst aspect of the current crisis affecting NATO has nothing to do with disparities regarding military capabilities. What really endangers the cohesion of the Alliance and provides the key to whether the organization really has a future is the loss of the organization’s raison d’être, the lack of a mission that can be shared by all of NATO’s members.

The fact that NATO has largely lost meaning in its members’ eyes is due to a structural cause: the disappearance during the 1990s of the shared threat which the organization was created in 1949 to combat. This was exacerbated by the practices the Alliance progressively adopted during the 1990s based on its new historic mission of providing peace support operations in civil conflicts taking place in third countries. The feeling that the organization has lost coherence and consistency is highlighted by the principles of variable geometry and voluntary participation that have come to override those of collective action.

In this respect, we do not believe that the reforms NATO requires can be carried out based on an appeal to the good will of its members, because certain structural factors demand considerably more than this. However, it is also true to say that, without the good will of its members, NATO will be incapable of reforming itself. We also believe that, however much the issue of the organization’s military deficiencies is addressed, NATO reform must inevitably tackle the question as to exactly what the member countries believe its role is and should be, including the missions it should carry out. In short, they must decide precisely what NATO’s purpose is.

We are aware of the fact that the current political situation within the Alliance continues to rub the open wounds of the Iraq crisis, wounds that resulted from conflicts caused by underlying trends that make it even more difficult to forge a consensus regarding the organization’s future. However, we are convinced that if the Alliance wishes to continue being
an attractive option for its members, it must find a way to rise above internal divisions in order to progress towards a more effective structure.

“The worst aspect of the current crisis affecting NATO has nothing to do with disparities regarding military capabilities. What really endangers the cohesion of the Alliance is the lack of a mission that can be shared by all of NATO’s members”

The purpose of NATO is to protect freedom and democracy. The goal of Islamist terrorism is to enforce its theocratic vision of the world, and in order to do so it is willing to attack our freedom and democracy. This can be read in all declarations, communiqués and speeches by its leaders. They also say that they are against all democracies, without distinctions. We should take their ambitions very seriously, no matter how ridiculous or delirious they may seem to us. The World was already given the chance, in the 30s, to realize that there are fanatics able to carry out the monstrosities for which they argue.

The main purpose of NATO should remain to collectively preserve freedom and democracy. Its mission right now must be clear: to combat Islamic jihadism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction mainly, but not exclusively, among Islamic groups and governments. These are different threats, but they tend to converge in the Greater Middle East. Terrorist groups seek to obtain increasingly more powerful means of destruction, means that are capable of producing the strongest possible impact on society through intolerable levels of damage and destruction. We know they have attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Certain dictatorial regimes are developing programs of this kind as a means of guaranteeing their capacity to continue supporting the activities of terrorist groups, groups that are not necessarily of their own nationality. They support these groups in order to promote and expand their fundamentalist, anti-democratic and anti-Western ideas. In the last instance, they are prepared to consider using these weapons of destruction in a war they have started themselves. It is behind these governments and organizations where we find Islamic extremists and, to a lesser extent, nationalists, who are prepared to conceive of the future of their communities in terms of confrontation between different visions of Islam and between the Muslim world and the West.
“We propose an effective NATO, one that will serve as the best means of standing up to our adversaries. We are also in favor of a reformed Alliance, one that proclaims what its members are: Western nations and liberal democracies, countries that love freedom and desire prosperity”

Not everyone in Europe realizes the nature of this threat or interprets it in the same way. In our view, the Alliance continues to be the best means of collective defense against the new threats against our freedom, democracy and peace, which, as we mentioned before, are real. The fact that these now take a different form does not make them any less lethal.

Several months ago the former Chancellor of Germany, Mr. Gerard Schröder pointed out the urgent need to rethink NATO. He was right. The current Secretary General, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer has undertaken a transformational agenda that must be lauded and supported. The goal of this report cannot be other than to make a contribution to this effort.

In this report we propose an effective NATO, one that will serve as the best means of standing up to our adversaries. However, we are also in favor of a reformed Alliance, one that proclaims what its members are: Western nations and liberal democracies, countries that love freedom and desire prosperity. In this respect, in the following pages we shall map out a new strategic vision for the Atlantic Alliance, as well as outline a series of practical measures that will help unite all of the organization’s members around this vision.

The future has yet to be written and the same obviously applies to NATO’s future. However, we are entirely convinced that if the Alliance remains the way it is, immersed in perpetual crisis, or simply undertakes a series of limited and partial reforms, not only will the future of the Alliance be called into question, but the security of its members, the security of us all, will be placed at risk. For this reason, we believe there is no alternative but to undertake an ambitious NATO review and transformational process. We must reinvent the Alliance; we must reimagine it. This is what is required.
PROPOSALS

- A new vision based on combating Islamist terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
  - Approval of a new strategic concept

- Development of a Homeland Security dimension
  - Staging of NAC meetings at a Home Affairs Minister level
  - Creation of a counter-terrorist functional command
  - Integration of security forces of a military nature
  - Creation of a continental early-warning system
  - Expansion of the Active Endeavor geographical framework
  - Creation of a joint cybernetic protection system

- Approval of democracy-building as an objective of peace operations, over and above the goal of nation-building
  - Creation of an operational command for post-conflict democracy-building operations
  - Establishment of a joint fund to finance these missions
  - Creation of a Partnership for Freedom (PfF)

- Expansion of the enlargement process
  - Invite Israel, Japan and Australia to join
  - Set up a strategic association with Colombia and India

- New Decision-Making Principles
  - Adoption of constructive abstention to smooth the functioning of Atlantic Alliance bodies
The current NATO crisis affects its very essence, not just its structures and procedures. Reforms that seek only to improve the latter will fail to solve its underlying problems. The Allies need to endow NATO with a new raison d’être and this new purpose must, in turn, ensure their collective security. This new mission or purpose for the Alliance can be none other than to protect freedom and democracy by defeating Islamist extremism. Islamist terrorism is a new shared threat of a global nature that places the very existence of NATO’s members at risk. As a collective defense organization, NATO has the duty to defend its members from this threat.

In order to overcome the strategic confusion as to what it should really do, NATO must take three measures: first, it must become aware of the degree to which it has drifted since the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR; second, it must admit that the approaches that govern the Alliance today, both in terms of orientation and practice, are insufficient when it comes to successfully combating the threat of Islamic jihadism that hangs over all the Allied members. NATO must be conscious of the fact that collective defense continues to be a vital necessity; third, it must adapt its structures and ideas in order to combat and defeat Islamist terrorism.

Historically speaking, NATO has been a highly successful alliance. In spite of its many internal divergences, the organization remained solid and united throughout the entire Cold War period, finally managing to prevail over its main enemy, the USSR. Furthermore, during the 1990s, within a new climate of security for which NATO was quite unprepared, the Alliance managed to transform itself in order to respond to the strategic challenges of the time, setting its defensive
duties on one side and reinventing itself as an organization that ensured regional security, an exporter of stability.

However, this success has been called into question. Since 2001 the Alliance has suffered a significant crisis each year. We could state that in recent years it has survived in a climate of perpetual crisis.

The current situation has been explained by causes of a very diverse nature. On the one hand, there are those who read a unilateralist intention in American security policy after September 11th, one that tends to banish collective organizations, including NATO, to the sidelines. On the other hand, there are those who believe that the EU’s new global ambitions tend to make the Europeans’ commitment to the European Union a priority, decreasing their availability to the Alliance; others believe that the key to understanding the current situation in which NATO finds itself resides in the disparities in military capability that exist between America and its European allies. As a further aggravating factor, some have pointed to the confrontation that emerged in the Alliance regarding the question of military intervention in Iraq in order to defeat Saddam Hussein.

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Although all of them are partly right, we believe that they are all manifestations of a much deeper cause, which is, in reality, the same cause that has created and sustained the current NATO crisis, possibly the greatest and most serious crisis in its entire history.

The Alliance has always been a troubled alliance, facing crisis after crisis. Proof of this is provided by the innumerable studies that have been devoted to them, from the shift from the strategy of massive retaliation to flexible response, France’s exit from the integrated military structure, management of the Greek-Turkish conflict, or the deployment of Euromissiles to name just a few. However, the difference between all of these crises and the one that ails the organization today
resides in the fact that the debate at that time revolved around the best strategy and means to ensure the best possible collective defense system, while today it is the very existence of this joint defense mechanism that lies at stake. It is NATO itself that has now been called into question.

The Alliance was founded due to the inability of many of the members to guarantee their own security in the face of an ongoing threat, one that endangered their existence and their way of life. The Alliance emerged as a commitment to defend themselves collectively thanks to the contributions of each of the members to the common cause; the common cause at the time in which NATO was founded in 1949, was none other than that of deterring the USSR from attacking Western Europe, as well as making the necessary preparations for joint military action should this deterrence fail and a war with Moscow ensue.

That is to say, NATO enhanced the security and defense of each and every one of its members. Through national contributions and joint mechanisms, the defense capacity of the Alliance’s member nations was superior to that of any one of the nations on its own. In other words, the strategic demands imposed by the global threat of the USSR could only be met by a joint defense arrangement. By participating in NATO, each member could be sure that it would be able to gain access to the resources of all the other members; each member would be guaranteed a form of defense equivalent to the nature and scale of the threat.

The problem that threatens to destroy NATO is that it has ceased to be an instrument that the organization’s members believe effectively ensures their defense and security through joint action. On the one hand, America knows that the War on Terror can be waged more effectively if it does not need to negotiate through collective decision-making mechanisms and if its strategy is not subject to restraints posed by the limited military capability of its allies. On the other hand, a view has gained ground in Europe that Islamist terrorism does not represent an existential threat, which is why there is little recognition of the need to act in accordance with the dimension and intensity of the threat we are really facing.

NATO’s development in the 1990s was both inevitable and desirable, but the strategic context today is very different from that of the
previous decade. If the Alliance wishes to continue being an effective tool in the future, it cannot simply content itself with consecrating the changes that have taken place, but must adapt to the new security situation, which is notably characterized by the threat of Islamist extremism. Projecting the great changes that took place in the 1990s on the current situation could, in fact, be counterproductive, when it comes to tackling the new threats that face us today.

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In the 1990s, NATO pursued a two-fold process: on the one hand, it completed its historical agenda based on overcoming divisions on the continent. In this respect, it successfully approached its former adversaries in the defunct Warsaw Pact and encouraged them to adopt many of its own values, organizational methods and procedures. NATO played a leading role in helping the armed forces of these countries complete the transition from serving totalitarian Communist regimes to underpinning democratic systems governed by civilian authorities chosen through free elections.

However, on the other hand, NATO managed to respond to the new demands of a changing strategic environment in which direct threats, such as that of the USSR, were replaced by the risks inherent in failed states and civil wars, as reflected in the events taking place at that time in the Balkans.

The development of new peace support missions during the 1990s—which ranged from traditional humanitarian aid tasks to peace enforcing—was made possible by the political and strategic climate of the decade. The Soviet threat had disappeared and the world imagined a much more benevolent place in which the Allies could aspire to an existence free from danger. Europe was a bubble of peace and stability, one that could cease to worry about security matters. No one in the 1990s
could perceive the existence or detect the presence of a threat that might equally threaten all the members of the Alliance, one of equal intensity and gravity as the threat posed by Moscow during the previous decades. The Western World was free from any direct threats. Threats, it was thought then, were replaced by risks and challenges.

In this respect, an organization whose entire military apparatus was based on principles, strategies, structures and deployment tactics designed to act as a deterrent to a USSR that no longer existed, discovered a new purpose in placing its military capacity at the service of third countries, in order to alleviate the suffering caused by these countries’ conflicts, to morally justify its own existence and attempt to contain the potential implications of such violent events. NATO thus ceased to be a collective defense organization, becoming an organization designed to ensure regional security, either as an armed wing at the disposal of the UN or as a defender of the principles of peaceful coexistence and respect for human rights.

NATO undertook the reform of its command structure with notable success, adopting a new strategic concept in which it formally acknowledged the practice of the previous years and rewarded its members for transforming their defense capabilities so that NATO would have a series of forces at its disposal that were deployable on the ground and could be employed to carry out peace support operations.

The relative speed with which it embarked on this new approach, as well as the smooth nature of the process, was celebrated in 1999 during the gala events organized in Washington to mark the 50th anniversary of the organization. But as events since then have borne out, the most important thing for NATO during those years was not the change in strategic approach, from collective defense to exporting peace and stability. The essential difference between pre-1989 NATO and the NATO of the 1990s resides in the fact that the former represented a vital need for its members. If they wished to survive the Soviet threat without renouncing their independence and freedom, they had no alternative other than to unite. The NATO of the 1990s turned to a framework based on elective cooperation. No one felt seriously threatened by the civil war in Bosnia, to cite one example, and when NATO decided to intervene in the region, it did so on a voluntary basis. Those who wished to contribute did so and on the scale they deemed appropriate. According to Allied procedures, nothing and no
one can force a Member State to send troops on peace-support missions when there has been no aggression against NATO soil. The NATO of the 1990s became a framework for the creation of ad hoc coalitions.

**“NATO should reward those members who are most strongly committed to collective defense and security and penalize those who pass the buck, not the opposite”**

We believe that this type of sporadic coalition of variable composition is necessary within a context in which not all the NATO Member Countries perceive risks in the same way, in which their interest differs depending on the region in question and in which their response to the crisis of the moment tends to be varied. Within an environment in which the security of each nation is affected in a very different way, the reaction will necessarily be extremely diverse. Only those who, for whatever reasons, feel most affected will be prepared to participate in collective action.

However, we also believe that ad hoc coalitions are only justifiable for missions in which the existential security of the members is not at stake. Within an environment in which the threat once again becomes universal, basing the Alliance’s actions on coalitions of members who are prepared to act is tantamount to penalizing those members who are most strongly committed to collective Atlantic defense. Not only do they risk the lives of their soldiers, but they also pick up the bill for this sacrifice. This effective penalization can only reduce the appeal of the Alliance. NATO should reward those members who are most strongly committed to collective defense and security and penalize those who pass the buck, not the opposite.

In short, the transformation of an essential Allied collective defense organization into a collective security organization in the 1990s was a logical development in view of the circumstances at the time. However, to be honest, it is very difficult to explain how the biggest and best military apparatus of all time could become a decisive tool for ensuring the security of others, as in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, but fail to play a role in Europe when it comes to guaranteeing the security of its citizens against Islamic terrorist attacks.
I. AN ALLIANCE WITH A NEW PURPOSE

There are those who claim that it is absurd to kill flies with cannon-fire and that NATO, in its capacity as a military tool, is not the appropriate structure with which to fight terrorism. Certainly no one would claim here that terrorism should be fought exclusively through military means. Any war, as highlighted by Clausewitz 200 years ago, is a combination of politics and military means and, therefore, any victory will involve political, psychological and economic factors, as well as military resources.

In our view, terrorism is only the war-like part of a much more far-reaching offensive against the liberal and democratic world. And it can be fought perfectly through military means, provided that the employment of military resources is set within the framework of a wider strategy, one that brings together other State and societal resources. We believe that NATO, after the appropriate changes have been introduced, can favor this general approach. The first requirement for victory is the will to win. This new vision of the Alliance should be reflected in a new strategic concept, given that we believe that the current approach, which dates back to 1999, has been surpassed by new strategic circumstances. This strategy looks back too much to the decade of the 1990s, when today it is a question of looking towards the future.
II
THE CASE FOR A NATO HOMELAND SECURITY DIMENSION

The Alliance has become an indisputable factor of stability in certain regions around the world and it must continue to play this role, exporting stability and laying the foundations for democratic reconstruction in societies that have just emerged from a conflict. We are not arguing against these missions, which we consider to be extremely important. However, this kind of activity, which provides wide-ranging support for peace, although certainly necessary, is no longer sufficient. NATO must recognize that the security conditions that affect its own members have changed over the last few years and that these members are under threat. Without abandoning their peace missions, the Allies must resume NATO's traditional functions in favor of their collective defense, effectively developing the protection the organization affords.

The idea of collective defense has witnessed a significant transformation over the last decade. The concept of traditional territorial defense –theoretically still in force within the Atlantic Alliance–, of defense against military aggression aimed at any of its members, must be transformed into a new concept of multifunctional collective defense. This is because, first of all, it is no longer simply a question of defending the members from threats from other States, but from terrorist attacks perpetrated in many cases by individuals who reside in our own countries. Second, the terrorists have extended their objectives to include soft targets as well as protected and symbolic targets, such as transport systems, in which they can cause the largest possible number of victims. Third, the terrorists have not ruled out the deployment of non-conventional means to perpetrate their attacks, such as nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical artifacts. Finally, it is not only a question of protecting NATO's geographical area, but of guaranteeing the increasingly decisive cybernetic area that characterizes today's developed societies.
In order to face new challenges relating to domestic security, the Alliance must assume an approach in which it enhances the homeland security of its members. The Alliance, based on the developments of the 1990s and in the absence of an enemy at the gates, has renounced all collective defense missions, whether it be in terms of territorial defense or this new dimension of homeland security. However, this has not always been the case. The mission of the forces at NATO’s disposal throughout the entire Cold War was not only to halt a possible invasion along the border between the two Germanies by the Warsaw Pact, but also to protect the critical infrastructures on its members’ territory and, in particular, to provide active defense against special Soviet units who might have been able to infiltrate the rearguard in order to commit acts of sabotage. This defense was conceived as an integral strategy. Furthermore, no one would be surprised if NATO itself should monitor the security of its members’ air space.

“There are three main terrorist threats that loom over the members of the Alliance today: the threat of a nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological (NBCR) attack, the use of sea freight containers as a support for conventional or non-conventional artifacts and the possibility of cyber-terrorism attacks. NATO must have the capacity to combat all these threats”

To a certain extent, Operation Active Endeavor, which takes place in the Straits of Gibraltar, in spite of all its limitations, represents the need for the Alliance to provide a collective answer to the increased vulnerability of international borders and its members’ vital sea lines of communication.

Whatever the case may be, the Alliance can and must do much more within this field. In our opinion, there are three main terrorist threats that loom over the members of the Alliance today: the threat of a nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological (NBCR) attack, the use of sea freight containers as a support for conventional or non-conventional artifacts and the possibility of cyber-terrorism attacks. NATO must have the capacity to combat all these threats.
In order to prevent NBCR attacks, NATO has a number of specialized radioactive material detection units at its disposal that could well be brought together in order to provide an early-warning system on a continental scale. Furthermore, the Alliance must create contingency plans in order to make its NBCR response capability available for managing the consequences of attacks of this kind against civilian targets. Finally, and in spite of the limitations of deterring tactics in the case of terrorist attacks, it is essential that NATO maintain a credible nuclear capacity in order to deter any State from succumbing to the temptation of collaborating with terrorist groups in developing this kind of technology.

With regard to the obvious degree of vulnerability involved in sea freight traffic, NATO must geographically extend the current *Active Endeavor* Operation in order to strengthen its control over sea traffic security. The Alliance must develop a shared surveillance and monitoring system for this kind of traffic, along the lines of the arrangements that the United States has established bilaterally with many countries—including most of NATO allies—under the framework of the so-called Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in view of the growing threat of a terrorist attack through sea freight channels.

“*It is urgent for the Atlantic Alliance to organize a series of top-level meetings, not only among foreign and defense ministers, but also among the home affairs ministers of the member nations. This is the only means by which NATO can truly enter the political field of homeland security*”

The rapid development of the information and communications technologies, which has created a new post-industrial society known as the Information Society or Knowledge Society, also entails the existence of new weak-points in our security, to which we are obliged to provide a response. In this respect, we believe that the Alliance would provide a natural framework in which to develop a joint protection system for a new cybernetic area which is, by definition, entirely global. In order to do this, we should authorize NATO to establish the security standards that should apply to our cybernetic networks, especially those that are critical from the point of view of citizen security (critical databases, energy or communications management systems and col-
lective transport management systems, among others). In addition, NATO should also develop the capacity to be able to neutralize cybernetic attacks of this kind.

This entire package of measures, of which we have only provided three examples and which are all aimed at endowing the Alliance with a new homeland security dimension, could only be implemented if NATO formulates an ambitious political project within this field. Not only should it do so, but the Alliance must also accept its unequivocal commitment to ensuring the homeland security of its members.

The strongest measure that has been taken to date has been to improve the flow and exchange of information among the member countries’ intelligence services. We believe that there are obvious limits within this field in view of the nature of the intelligence world, which is why it is both desirable and possible to go further. In our view, it is urgent for the Atlantic Alliance to organize a series of top-level meetings, not only among foreign and defense ministers, but also among the home affairs ministers of the member nations. This is the only means by which NATO can truly enter the political field of homeland security.

Although the final goal of this process is for the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to stage an official meeting at a home affairs ministers level, the formula for reaching this point could be initially based on a series of informal meetings, in the same way as defense ministers meet in the European Union.

The advantages of home affairs minister meetings are many. First of all, they can provide an initial multilateral forum at which European home affairs ministers can sit down alongside their American and Canadian counterparts. This would not mean reducing the contact levels and cooperation that exist bilaterally between Washington and many European countries. It would simply be a question of promoting a new framework for multilateral agreement. What is more, the European members of the EU already stage meetings of this kind amongst themselves, without diminishing other forms of closer cooperation at a lower level. Their experience would be extremely valuable to NATO.

However, in addition to the important political contributions they might make, these home affairs ministers could contribute to the
Alliance all of the capacities that many of them have at their disposal as part of their national intelligence services and, in some cases, interior security forces, such as the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri and the Spanish Guardia Civil. It is essential to involve these forces today in a new joint defense dimension. NATO has traditionally included them when it comes to calculating the budget demands made on its members for defense purposes. The time has now come for them to be fully included in NATO’s operational plans and not only as a complement to the armed forces in peace missions abroad.

“NATO should create a counter-terrorism command whose mission would be to prepare the concepts, doctrines, technologies and staff required to lead anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism missions, as well as to coordinate the organization’s entire effort within this field”

Nevertheless, for these forces to be able to play a significant role within the framework of homeland security within the Alliance and for this facet to be effectively brought into play at NATO, it will be necessary to reform Allied command structures. These structures continue to reflect the geo-strategic requirements of the past and are largely based on a geographical distribution of authority. This set-up is simpler than the one that operated throughout the Cold War, but it is derived from the same context.

NATO does, in fact, have a command structure whose authority is not based on any specific geographical area: Allied Command Transformation, based in Norfolk, Virginia. Following this example, NATO should create a counter-terrorism command whose mission would be to prepare the concepts, doctrines, technologies and staff required to lead anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism missions, as well as to coordinate the organization’s entire effort within this field. This command structure should, in turn, have its own evaluation center to assess the terrorist threat both inside and outside the Alliance’s political boundaries.

This counter-terrorism command body would be ultimately responsible for defense plans to combat terrorism and should not only be able to rely on the armed forces of the member countries, but also
II. THE CASE FOR A NATO HOMELAND SECURITY DIMENSION

have access to the domestic resources that the Allies are able to place at the disposal of the collective defense strategy.

NATO must be clear about one thing: the threat of Islamist terrorism is not only global, capable of successfully attacking and striking capitals such as New York, Madrid and London, as we have witnessed to our distress; the terrorist threat does not only fail to correspond to conventional criteria, in the sense that it is a diffuse and asymmetrical phenomenon. It is a threat that cannot be understood in geographical terms. And it cannot be conceived as either an external or internal phenomenon either. Terrorism is an ongoing challenge which confounds any traditional concept of internal or external security. In fact, this administrative distinction created by the Western World represents an advantage to terrorists, one that complements the way they operate and clearly constitutes a weak-point in our capacity to defend our societies.

In this respect, seeking to maintain NATO as an organization concerned exclusively with external security, in areas located outside the soil of its member countries, is to waste one of the best resources available to Western democracies when it comes to combating terrorist violence. Even worse, it not only places the emphasis on an erroneous strategic approach, but also exacerbates the moral disarmament of our nations.

“We will only be in a position to defeat Islamic terrorism if we use all the resources at the disposal of the State. And to the extent that the threat we are faced with is global, we will only be able to defeat terrorism definitively if the response is collective. This is why it is so essential for NATO to take on responsibility for defeating Islamic jihadism as its key mission”

The Alliance has always been a defense organization designed to protect the territory of its members, and it was only in the 1990s, in the absence of any threat of invasion and during its obsession with peace missions abroad, that the organization began to forget its true mission. What we are proposing is nothing more than a return to NATO’s basic functions, while adapting them to new circumstances. It
is no longer a question of defending ourselves from the tanks of the Red Army, but of fighting Islamic terrorism, a much more shapeless and ubiquitous enemy than that represented by conventional armed forces.

Coinciding with the incorporation of homeland security instruments, especially with regard to interior security forces, the counter-terrorism structure should promote changes regarding the organization, structures, procedures, units, training and deployment of the armed forces belonging to NATO’s member countries, thus enabling them to play a major role in the war on terrorism within NATO’s own borders.

In fact, these forces are already employed when the level of threat exceeds the capacity of State security and police forces. NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) already monitors our airspace when summit meetings are held among leaders or during special events or occasions, such as competition openings; antiaircraft batteries are also deployed for the defense of terminals and specific locations in the surrounding areas where such events take place; and infantry soldiers are also deployed, sometimes in large numbers, to improve the protection of critical infrastructures.

However, the armed forces should complement these passive defense tasks with other measures of a preventive nature. It is the task of the Alliance’s member nations to develop a new legal framework that clearly defines the role and responsibilities of the armed forces and their various units when it comes to tackling terrorism inside the countries themselves, establishing the cases in which this is necessary and under whose authority the measures are implemented. It is customary for the deployment of military units to be understood as being always under the control of the State security force command structures. We believe that the nature and intensity of the Islamist extremism threat demands a review of this approach, with the armed forces being considered to be a complement to the State security forces and vice versa.

NATO’s counter-terrorist command structure should promote this new approach in order to achieve greater and closer cooperation between home security forces and the armed forces. What is more, it should transform the way armies conceive of the terrorist phenomenon today and the best way of combating it. Given that we are dealing
with a non-conventional enemy, one that is neither State-wide nor military-based in the strictest sense of the term, the degree of force that should be applied in order to counter terrorist plans or eliminate terrorist threats clearly clashes with the traditional military approach of preparing for operations that require an intensive use of force. Only recent involvement in peace support missions has led to new approaches in which the degree of force employed is moderated and limited, giving rise to what are known as operations other than war.

Not only could the same kind of moderation be applied to measures at home, but armies could be endowed with the technical and surveillance capacity, communications, transport, etc., that would make them a very useful tool in waging the war on terror. In this respect, the Alliance’s counter-terrorism command structure could formulate a series of recommendations regarding the types of systems, weapons and materials the member countries’ armed forces should acquire in order to provide a better collective response to the terrorist threat. For example, unmanned aircraft could be developed with sustained surveillance and strike capabilities.

We will only be in a position to defeat Islamic terrorism if we use all the resources at the disposal of the State. And to the extent that the threat we are faced with is global, we will only be able to defeat terrorism definitively if the response is collective. This is why it is so essential for NATO to take on responsibility for defeating Islamic jihadism as its key mission.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that terrorism does not respect any borders and its cells are located both in third countries and within the countries that form part of NATO itself, it is vital that the Alliance should assume responsibility for the homeland security of its members as soon as possible.
III
A GLOBAL COUNTER-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY

For several decades the Alliance’s Member States have voiced their concern over the risks entailed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the general development of missile programs that provide a capacity to carry these weapons. Proliferation is a source of instability, given that it increases the pressure on other States to enhance their capability and makes military confrontation more feasible. In this respect, a considerable effort has been made to define mechanisms of all kinds whose purpose is to give shape to a non-proliferation regime. Agreements, specialized agencies, inspection bodies and ongoing diplomatic activities have had to contain a trend that seems quite unstoppable.

The Atlantic Alliance can congratulate itself for the work it has carried out. It has played its role in convincing certain countries that they should abandon their programs. It has also provided credibility and support for the various mechanisms that make up the non-proliferation regime.

The Alliance has been able to act with such decisiveness because the Member States share both a concern for the consequences of proliferation and a belief in the doctrinal basis on which the non-proliferation regime is founded. Proof of this is provided by the fact that in the very midst of the fall-out resulting from the serious strategic divide over the Iraq War, both Europeans and Americans have worked closely together in order to find a solution to the Iranian crisis. The threat posed by the nuclear program being nurtured by the radical Islamic Government of Teheran is perceived equally on both sides of the Atlantic. This highlights the disparity of interests between Russia and China, on the one hand, and Europe, on the other. What is more, it reveals the strategic incoherency of a European-Chinese-Russian axis.
We presently find ourselves at a critical point. We have discovered that our inspection mechanisms and intelligence services have been incapable of preventing the trafficking of technological means and know-how, activities that have spread to various countries from Pakistan and North Korea. North Korea has violated two treaties and deceived the international community, ultimately acknowledging that it has two nuclear programs and a small arsenal of atomic bombs. Iran has violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty and concealed a nuclear program whose existence for civil purposes is difficult to comprehend.

“There are governments that consider nuclear weapons to be of considerable utility, even if they are not planning to use them on the battlefield. In view of their inferior conventional military forces, they rely on the nuclear deterring effect in order to continue propagating fanatical, totalitarian and anti-Western ideas with impunity”

The effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime has been called into question, while new realities have led to a review of its founding principles. For years the international community considered the handling of non-proliferation matters to be a question among States, since only States had the capacity to finance such sophisticated research programs and subsequently employ the results on the battlefield. This is no longer the case. We have learned that isolated individuals or bodies with a minimum infrastructure at their service have been able to develop international networks for trafficking nuclear components, operating at levels that exceed the worst possible forecasts of intelligence services or Western analysts. There are already too many indications of attempts by terrorist groups to acquire the knowledge and technology required to produce and use weapons of mass destruction. The aim of these groups is to use such systems to perpetrate attacks designed to produce huge material damage, as well as a serious psychological impact on the population.

The commitment shown by the Alliance and its members to ensure a non-proliferation regime has led many governments to reach the conclusion that weapons of mass destruction are very difficult to employ. However, Western readings within this field are far
from universally accepted. What is more, there are governments that consider nuclear weapons to be of considerable utility, even if they are not planning to use them on the battlefield. In view of their inferior conventional military forces, they rely on the nuclear deterring effect in order to continue propagating fanatical, totalitarian and anti-Western ideas with impunity. The spectre of an atomic mushroom-cloud serves as their terrifying emblem in the case of any possible insurrection or outside intervention. Weapons of mass destruction thus provide a guarantee for their dissemination of radical and intolerant ideas, one that would be extremely risky to oppose.

Any offensive use of these weapons by these regimes would be reserved for extreme situations but could more easily be granted to non-governmental organizations created to serve as an implementary wing. States continue to provide the ideal framework for the development of these technologies, but some governments seem to be prepared to offer them in developed form to terrorist groups for their use. The same ends would be achieved, but by avoiding responsibility.

States, groups and individuals can act either on their own or collectively in order to provide certain governments or terrorist groups with weapons of this kind, effectively eroding the non-proliferation regime. However, the problem of the increasing number of illegal traffickers has been compounded by an extension of the geographical arena in which such contacts take place. Dr. Khan established links between North Korea and Pakistan, and these countries formed connections with Iran and Libya. There are many other examples we could cite in order to illustrate the extent to which the network of proliferating interests has become a global problem.

“The Alliance should not replace the non-proliferation control framework, since this is not its mission. However, it must give shape to a counter-proliferation strategy that clearly defines the measures to be adopted and possible joint action to be taken in view of the inability of the current non-proliferation regime to respond to a crisis situation”
In this respect, we are convinced that the non-proliferation regime has been overtaken by events. The Alliance continues to provide an ideal framework for Member States to reflect upon the new challenges to our collective security raised by successive attempts to breach agreements and violate the current non-proliferation institutional framework. This review process should lead to new proposals for adapting mechanisms—agreements, agencies, inspection bodies—and for preparing NATO itself to take the necessary measures to combat all the various stages of the proliferation process. These measures would range from prevention to negotiation and, where necessary, direct pressure, without discarding the option of force.

The Alliance should not replace the non-proliferation control framework, since this is not its mission. However, it must give shape to a counter-proliferation strategy that clearly defines the measures to be adopted and possible joint action to be taken in view of the inability of the current non-proliferation regime to respond to a crisis situation. The Alliance must continue to make progress with regard to the ever-complex matter of shared intelligence. States must provide information and intelligence so that the Alliance can effectively evaluate the seriousness of any particular threat and establish monitoring mechanisms and coordinate the various governments. The joint handling of a problem facilitates the decision-making process and strengthens ties among members of the Alliance.

The sheer variety of traffickers and links that have been established between governments and terrorist groups obliges us to adopt new approaches and create new structures. NATO must consider whether the current structure is the most effective when it comes to sharing intelligence and monitoring crisis situations. In our opinion, part of these responsibilities should be given to the counter-terrorist command structure we have proposed.

The global nature of these networks requires an equally global response. A regional perspective is insufficient. The Alliance must assume the leading role and work alongside other democracies and all other States that are prepared to prevent this grave threat from becoming a reality, ensuring that specialized agencies and international bodies adopt the necessary reforms and employ all of the resources at their disposal. The current situation within the Alliance cannot continue with regard to this matter. The incorporation of new
members belonging to different regions, as we propose in this report, could help NATO to prepare itself more effectively when it comes to combating this global phenomenon. Furthermore, the development of counter-terrorism capacities will provide greater flexibility and a wider range of options for Allied action against proliferating parties, whether they have declared themselves or not.
IV
DEMOCRACY BUILDING:
A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE

In the 1990s the Atlantic Alliance began to carry out stabilization and peace support and guarantee missions, motivated by the genocide policies of Milosevic and his henchmen in Bosnia and Kosovo. The decision to intervene in order to put a stop to the horrors witnessed in third countries was neither rapid nor easy. Whatever the case may be, the impetus for NATO to take military action for the first time in its history and outside the geographical boundaries defined by the Treaty of Washington was provided by two complementary factors: on the one hand, social pressure to do something and put a stop to the tragedy that was taking place on our doorstep; on the other, pressures inside NATO itself aimed at defining a mission that would give the organization a new meaning following the end of the Cold War period.

NATO’s armed intervention led to an obvious improvement of the situation, effectively stabilizing the war zone. However, we should admit that if NATO had shown its resolve to intervene at an earlier time, much of the destruction, violence and horror witnessed in the Balkans could have been avoided.

Throughout these years, the words on everyone’s lips were “failed States” and “nation building”. Wherever States were crumbling and governments proved incapable of guaranteeing the physical, political and military control of large parts of the country, they became a “failed State”, absolutely incapable of guaranteeing the security of their citizens. Domestic strife, in many cases, caused a destabilizing effect in neighboring countries, threatening, on occasion to become a problem for international stability.

Willing to protect themselves from this contagious violence and motivated by moral and humanitarian reasons, Western nations, and
NATO’s members in particular, established a double strategy: to put a stop to the violence by exporting stability; and, subsequently, rebuilding the institutional apparatus of the State in question. This became known as “nation building”.

The goal of this “nation building” effort was to achieve a stable State, the basis for more widespread social and political stability. However, as we could observe in both Bosnia and Kosovo, giving priority to stability aspects led to an acceptance of practices that are incompatible with fully democratic government.

We are convinced that these missions can only succeed politically if, instead of seeking to simply rebuild the failed State that is “nation building”, NATO actually promotes “democracy building”. That is to say, it must evaluate the type of political regime it aspires to restore to power.

“In regions where democracy is an alien idea, or where it is scarce or simply non-existent, security requires the elimination of regimes based on fear and oppression. The expansion of democracy is the political way, complementary to the equivalent of a military, designed to combat extremism”

This is much more than a mere terminology debate. It is an essential part of the counter-terror strategy. Wherever the foundations for democracy exist, the emphasis could well be placed on the effective functioning and stability of the country’s institutions, without any further measures. However, in regions where democracy is an alien idea, or where it is scarce or simply non-existent, security requires the elimination of regimes based on fear and oppression.

The expansion of democracy is the political way, complementary to the equivalent of a military, designed to combat extremism. While the recourse to armed force should be aimed at pursuing terrorists and foiling their plans, a political thrust to transform dictatorial regimes into freedom-based systems as the best way to put an end to the inculcation of hate, violence and intolerance is indispensable.

However, for the Alliance to be able to effectively carry out this task of creating democratic nations out of countries ravaged by civil wars,
or to be able to instigate political change where it is required, it must introduce some important changes.

With regard to its command structures, it is highly probable that it will need to establish a new operational command entrusted with carrying out wide-ranging peace support and democracy building missions. This command would be in charge of coordinating all activities, civilian and military, during post-war periods, leading towards the effective democratization –and not simply the smooth functioning– of the country’s institutions.

At the same time, NATO must modify the procedures with which it decides to implement peace support tasks. These missions, despite being the result of a collective decision, in practice depend on the voluntary contributions of the Member States, including the resources they are prepared to provide and their corresponding level of commitment. In fact, the implementation of these peace missions entails an unbearable degree of inequality: those who take part run a greater political risk than those who do not contribute any troops, while participation also entails a serious burden on defense budgets, given that the financing system is based on the idea that those who go on such missions pay their own way. This not only places a heavier burden on those who run the greatest risks, both in political and operational terms, but also places serious limitations on the Alliance’s scope of action, to the extent that many of the countries that are prepared to take part in such missions do not have sufficient financial resources to face the costs that derive from participating in them.

“NATO must modify the procedures with which it decides to implement peace support tasks. The principle of ‘those who go also pay’ must be replaced as soon as possible with a formula whereby ‘all pay for those who carry out the task’”

We believe that the formula proposed by the current Secretary General of NATO, which consists of setting up a joint fund for these operations, is essential if the Alliance wishes to continue meeting its commitments and implementing these tasks. The principle of “those who go also pay” must be replaced as soon as possible with a formula whereby “all pay for those who carry out the task”.
Whatever the case may be, post-conflict democracy building is not the only means by which NATO can favor the expansion of democracy. As we witnessed throughout the entire last decade, the Alliance enjoys considerable public support and appeal, and it must be prepared to invest its political capital in order to produce the desired results.

Following the example of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to a certain extent, we believe the Alliance should create a Partnership for Freedom, aimed mainly at attracting the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, collectively promoting the measures required to introduce economic liberalization, respect for freedom of worship and open and democratic political systems.

First of all, this Partnership for Freedom should provide an additional measure with regard to the Mediterranean Dialogue that various members of NATO have established with their southern neighbors. The goal must clearly be one of promoting democracy and freedom throughout the region, understood in its widest sense, stretching from Mauritania to Afghanistan. However, the coherence of this exercise must ensure that mere desire and inclusion in this geographical region are not sufficient in themselves to ensure membership of this Partnership. The members must demonstrate a clear desire for democratic reform. If they do not present any evidence of promoting a move towards a system based on freedoms, they cannot be members of the Partnership. NATO cannot be party to an additional exercise in multilateral self-deception.

Only by promoting and extending democracy throughout the world can the Alliance lay the foundations for a safer world.
EXPANDING THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

The first NATO enlargement process during the 1950s was based on political and operational considerations, although it was the latter that took priority. The Allies needed a more extensive field of action, both in terms of time and space, in order to defend themselves adequately and to do this it was necessary to incorporate the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The second wave of enlargement, in the late 1990s, was imposed by political changes in Europe following the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Opening the door to the former members of the Warsaw Pact was simply a recognition of a new reality, a means of helping to overcome the artificial division that had been created in Europe in its day by the strategy pursued by the USSR. In this respect, rather than simply signifying an increase in military capabilities, the expansion towards the East corresponded to historical-political criteria. It was a question of making the East-West confrontation a thing of the past.

We believe that it was necessary for NATO to go beyond the Cold War agenda both morally and strategically. In this respect, everything NATO has done to expand towards Central Europe has been correct. The only aspect we might lament is the relative slowness with which NATO opened up to its former adversaries.

Furthermore, we do not believe that this process of enlarging towards the East should end with the members that have recently been incorporated. We must recognize the fact that there are other members calling at NATO’s door that should also be accepted as members, ranging from the Ukraine to various Caucasian Republics.

We propose a far-reaching review of the non-written criteria that have governed the various NATO enlargement processes, so that the
organization can tackle the challenges that characterize the strategic environment in which it must now operate. Up until now, enlargement has been a means of channeling and consolidating the democratic changes of the former Communist countries. Now the moment has come to move in the opposite direction, namely to expand towards those democratic nations that are committed to fighting against our collective enemy and are prepared to contribute to the joint effort required to defeat that enemy.

“We believe that NATO should invite countries such as Israel, Japan and Australia to join the organization, nations that not only share our values and way of life, but which present deep-rooted and effective democracies and which, like us, are plagued by terrorism and the risks inherent in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”

We believe that NATO should invite countries such as Israel, Japan and Australia to join the organization, nations that not only share our values and way of life, but which present deep-rooted and effective democracies and which, like us, are plagued by terrorism and the risks inherent in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, in many cases these same countries have sent contingents to take part in peace missions alongside the members of the Alliance, in addition to being members of international coalitions in various parts of the world.

For NATO this would no doubt represent a considerable leap forward. For one thing, the organization would definitively leave behind its regional origins, given that this new make-up would have made it into a defense and security organization on a worldwide scale. However, only an organization with a capacity to act on a global scale can successfully tackle the threat of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Even more importantly, the Alliance would fully and openly assume its true form, the form it should undoubtedly take: that of a free association of democratic countries that are committed to promoting an open and liberal way of life based on the market economy, religious tolerance and respect for human rights. Although the reigning Realpolitik
of the Cold War period and other practical requirements meant that the democratic principle was not always upheld within the organization, with certain exceptions being made regarding its members, today there is no longer any need for this to be the case. It is quite the contrary, in fact. The new threats that face us demand that we recognize what we really are and what we wish to be. Our enemies must also be made aware of this.

NATO must become the military instrument of our democracies in front of the totalitarian movements that are attacking us. We believe that the best way of doing this is to open up to various countries in their fight against terror. Bringing Israel into the Alliance is an extremely important step in this respect.

We are fully aware that Israel’s membership of NATO poses greater political problems, for example, than that of Australia. Nevertheless, we believe that the benefits of this expansion would well outweigh any possible disadvantages. What is more, NATO and Israel would not be starting from scratch. In fact, since the Istanbul Summit of 2004, the Alliance’s authorities and those of Israel have been drawing up a framework for closer cooperation between the two parties as a part of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. Unfortunately, the Alliance has not been able to go one step further and grant this important relationship the publicity it deserves, nor has any initiative been designed that goes beyond the narrow framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue. It is time to change this attitude.

Although the ultimate goal is to secure the membership of these countries, the process could commence with the establishment of an Associated Nation arrangement as a provisional stage, limited in time, just for the necessary operational harmonization process to be completed. The advantage of this procedure is that other candidates could be progressively incorporated into NATO through a mechanism that helps them to meet the organization’s requirements. In this respect, we might mention certain Latin American countries, such as Colombia, or nations such as India. The Alliance should take unequivocal steps to attract these two nations by developing a framework for closer cooperation with both countries.
NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM
VI
AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM

The security agenda has not become any less important over the last few years, contrary to what was thought in the early 1990s. However, NATO, the cornerstone of the strategic structure throughout the Cold War, certainly has been progressively displaced to the margins of the security strategy. The inertia of the past and the organization’s rather slow adaptation are the key aspects that explain this loss of status.

Throughout the entire decade of the 1990s, the ghost of the Alliance’s internal break-up was attributed almost obsessively to the disparity that exists between the military capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic. With double the number of soldiers in active service and an accumulated defense budget of two thirds the American budget, the Europeans could hardly make a significant contribution, either in terms of numbers or quality, when it came to participating in combat operations. It is no great surprise that the greatest preoccupation of the former Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, was to promote Allied capabilities, above all on the part of the Europeans.

“The split within the Alliance is not the result of the military disparity between the United States and the Europeans. That is just a false assumption. The division has been created by the lack of shared principles on which action is to be taken”

We must recognize the fact that NATO, over the last few years, has identified its deficiencies successfully and set its members in the right direction when it comes to defining the approach and the acquisitions they should make for their armed forces. Even so, the parsimony with which the questions of military transformation and improvements in
capacity have been tackled has exacerbated the Transatlantic gap. This does not mean, however, that the European Allies are incapable of contributing more to a joint campaign today if they should decide to do so. No one can deny today that, in terms of capabilities, the Allies are much better off today than they were five years ago, in spite of the fact that they still have much to do to be properly prepared for the operations that may be required in the near future.

However, the split within the Alliance is not the result of the military disparity between the United States and the Europeans. That is just a false assumption. The division has been created by the lack of shared principles on which action is to be taken. Or rather, it is based on amnesia regarding the governing principles on which the Alliance was founded and sustained in the first place.

NATO was not created to contain Soviet expansionism. It certainly was an effective instrument of deterrence against the threat of a possible attack from the East, but this strategic objective was simply a means to achieving the real end, that of maintaining the liberal democratic regimes of Western Europe. The Alliance was established for positive reasons rather than negative. As is reflected in the Preamble of the Treaty of Washington, the signatories declared that they were “Determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”. This declaration was coherent with regard to the spirit of the time, with two world wars having already taken place and the world believing itself to be on the verge of an inevitable Third World War. Europeans and Americans together expressed their will to work together in favor of peace and freedom. They sought to be themselves, they sought to live under democracy and in order to do so they were resolved “to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security”.

Their approach was not always entirely coherent, it is true. Exceptions were made, with countries such as Salazar’s Portugal or Turkey being accepted based on a pragmatic realism, founded on the belief that it was better to live with the lesser of two evils in certain situations in order to counter the overwhelming threat from Moscow. However, the cases we have mentioned are as true as is the case of Spain, a country that was consciously excluded from NATO until the transition towards democracy took place. Ernest Bevin, the British
Foreign Secretary at the time, established the position that would subsequently prevail: in spite of the indisputable strategic value of Spanish territory and the importance of the Spanish military contingent, welcoming the Francoist Government into the Alliance would have made the organization nothing more than a mere anti-Communist instrument, a price that was too high to pay.

In the 1990s, the organization’s defense of freedom was blurred by the fact that it was able to justify all its peace support missions on the basis of stability. The Allies chose to freeze situations rather than resolve them and although reality ended up imposing itself in the Balkans and Milosevic’s fall was precipitated by intervention in Kosovo, NATO cannot boast of seeking to change the brutal regime that governed from Belgrade at that time.

We are convinced that those days must be left behind for good and that what we need is an Alliance that acts on its own principles and is prepared to defend them. In contrast to those who would like to turn NATO into a mere forum for political-strategic consultation between the United States and Europe, we believe that the Alliance has enough bodies to ensure that this type of dialogue takes place. What we urgently need is an organization that is prepared to act.

The Alliance was victorious in the Cold War when the USSR finally collapsed. NATO must now fight and defeat those who do not hide their objective, the destruction of our open and free societies. The alternative can only be our defeat.

**“NATO must become, in fact, an Alliance for Freedom. And this is no mere tactical invention. Freedom makes us what we are and the defense of our threatened freedom can provide us with the political unity we require to secure a victory in the war on terror”**

The fight against terror is an imperative that has been imposed on Western societies. We believe that NATO is an excellent instrument, one that, with the changes we propose, is capable of defending us from terror and defeating it on our terms. In order to do this NATO must undoubtedly incorporate a series of new capacities. But it is even
more important that it recover its principles, so that its actions are always based on defending its true values.

The American President, George W. Bush, was right when he said that “the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world”. We agree with him because we believe that, in order to defeat terrorism, it is not sufficient to simply pursue and eliminate the terrorists themselves, but it is important to put an end to environments that serve as a hotbed for terrorist groups to draft in new members. These environments are none other than political oppression, religious intolerance, economic asphyxiati on, the systematic teaching of hatred against the Western and the modern world, corrupt administration and, in general, the sensation that the future holds nothing especially promising.

For this reason we believe that the Alliance must bring into play its principles and values. It must strengthen a belief in them among its own members and it must actively promote them wherever it is required. NATO must become, in fact, an Alliance for Freedom. And this is no mere tactical invention. Freedom makes us what we are and the defense of our threatened freedom can provide us with the political unity we require to secure a victory in the war on terror.

In order to brandish the flag of freedom more effectively, we have outlined the measures we believe NATO should adopt above. All of them are feasible proposals. First, we must begin by defending freedom on our own territory. NATO must become the best means of ensuring our homeland security. Second, NATO must act in order to eliminate threats wherever they arise, anticipating events where necessary. Failing to take action or taking measures too late in this era of mass terrorism is tantamount to condemning large numbers of compatriots to death. Finally, but no less importantly, NATO must clearly declare its liberal and democratic principles. It should do this in two ways: on the one hand, by opening its doors to those countries that share our essential values and are actively committed to defending them. We have highlighted the need to invite Israel, Japan and Australia to form part of NATO, although the same invitation could also be extended to countries such as Colombia, at least to join the proposed Partnership for Freedom. In spite of those who seek to conceal the fact, NATO is a moral force of universal scope.
VI. AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM

And precisely because of its moral dimension, which far outweighs the military dimension, the Alliance must also promote political openness in the Arab and Muslim world, substantially modifying its Mediterranean Dialogue, both in terms of procedures and goals.

In short, if the Alliance wishes to serve the strategic interests of its members, we see no other option than for it to become an Alliance for Freedom. No other approach is capable of resolving the organization’s problems or granting it a more significant role. What is worse, no other approach will help to free us of the current threats and dangers that hang over the world.
VII
THE COST OF A DEFUNCT NATO

NATO is suffering today from lack of interest on the part of America and the negligence of the majority of Europeans. This lack of interest is the result of Europe’s real inability to work together with the American troops and constant diatribes as to what NATO should or should not do, the result of different strategic approaches. The sense of negligence has arisen from the chronic inability of European political leaders to convince their electorates of the need to make a greater defense effort. It is also based on the quiet confidence that if something serious should happen, our American Allies would always run to our aid.

The problem is that the Alliance has been able to function—and could continue to do so—with the American armed forces prepared to work alongside European forces that are reticent to do so or incapable of doing so. That is to say, NATO can survive the operational impotence of the European allies.

However, if the Americans decided to leave the organization this would undoubtedly deal the deathblow to NATO. Without the Americans’ strategic leadership and without their military capability and their troops, NATO would be nothing more than a fiction.

Since the Iraq crisis, NATO has developed some worrisome features. One thing is to talk about a disparity in military capacity and another is to have to deal with antagonistic strategic perspectives. However, if it is simply a question of handling conflicting visions of the Alliance, dialogue can no doubt produce a certain consensus. That is the way it has always been at NATO. The true problem reveals itself when the Alliance is used as another platform where an anti-American agenda is carried out. NATO is then turned into a political battlefield, not even a strategic one. This is the path of assured destruction.
“NATO can survive the operational impotence of the European allies. However, if the Americans decided to leave the organization this would undoubtedly deal the deathblow to NATO. Without the Americans’ strategic leadership and without their military capability and their troops, NATO would be nothing more than a fiction”

In Europe, those who do not believe in the Transatlantic link consider that the time has come to put an end to it. For some, it was a useful arrangement in the past, while others do not even concede this point. However, they all agree that, now that the Cold War is over, Europe and the United States should go their separate ways, given that their interests are not the same. They are convinced that the main problem today is American hegemony, rather than Islamic fundamentalism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and rogue States. In order to address this “problem”, their aim is to establish counterweight mechanisms and use international bodies as a battleground where they can curtail or frustrate American initiatives. Conscious of the sympathies the Alliance still demands, these nations avoid any direct attacks on NATO. However, they are prepared to block any process of adaptation to the new strategic environment.

Maintenance of the current status quo, as manifested in a reluctance to openly tackle a meaningful strategic debate, will lead the Alliance towards an increasingly irrelevant and marginal role. NATO no longer discusses important issues, having become just another bureaucratic mechanism, one that justifies itself by its own existence and by the services it offers its members. In this respect, it only benefits those who, for one reason or another, seek to turn NATO into something other than a collective defense organization. If the Alliance proves to be incapable of solving the regional security problem, the conditions will be created for the Member States to find the need to develop their own security system within the European Union. It is evident that the European Union will be unable to provide the level of security offered by NATO over the next few decades, but this does not matter. The Alliance’s detractors feel little need to have large armed forces at their disposal. Neither are they prepared, in many cases, to resort to the use of force.
“Allowing NATO to die as a joint defense mechanism has implications that are much more harmful to Europeans than they are to the Americans. Europe is not capable of defending itself on its own and it is even less capable of defending its interests beyond its borders”

To allow the United States’ current lack of interest to become a sense of aversion means leaving NATO to die in its capacity as a collective organization that links the two sides of the Atlantic. And let us be clear about one thing: allowing NATO to die as a joint defense mechanism has implications that are much more harmful to Europeans than they are to the Americans.

Europe is not capable of defending itself on its own and it is even less capable of defending its interests beyond its borders. Solemn declarations in favor of an European Security and Defense Policy, which have been repeated ad infinitum, have produced nothing more than realistic studies that highlight our military deficiencies and lack of real military capability. We should admit that most Europeans are not prepared to pay for our own security.

Paradoxically, the European Union, which should be at least equal to the sum of all its members, is much more inferior in military terms than the various members taken one by one. This explains why, for example, the United Kingdom was capable of deploying forty-five thousand men in the war in Southern Iraq while the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) goal is to be able to mobilize half this number. And the same thing is beginning to occur in the case of NATO. Two-thirds of its members are contributing to a greater or lesser extent to ensuring the security of Iraq, but the organization has limited itself to a minimum commitment, that of merely training Iraq’s security forces.

There is much talk about transforming NATO. In fact, the Secretary General is doing everything he can to help the members reach an agreement as to what NATO should be like in 15 years’ time, including its possible missions and ambitions, overcoming national caveats and the sticky issue of how they should pay for NATO’s activities. But the
VII. THE COST OF A DEFUNCT NATO

truth is that what NATO requires is not only to do better, but to also do different things.

“The worst thing NATO can do, apart from doing nothing, is to allow its members to continue regarding the organization as nothing more than a forum in which they are permitted to make disparate and intermittent commitments; that is to say, a NATO à la carte”

In order to overcome the decision-making paralysis that results from the fact that Atlantic Council decisions must be based on a consensus, a procedure might be adopted that falls short of resorting to a direct vote but at least prevents the minority from blocking measures desired by the majority. The idea of a constructive abstention could be borrowed from the EU in this respect. Would this new mechanism facilitate the decision-making process? It is possible and this option is certainly worth exploring.

However, at the end of the day, we do not believe that is an ideal solution. In fact, it is a rather bureaucratic solution. A member country may choose to abstain from a peace mission that it considers to be inappropriate or far-removed from its national strategic interests. However, we are no longer talking about an environment quite as benign as the 1990s when NATO could choose the conflicts in which it wished to get involved. We all suffer the same threat so every member must contribute to—and show solidarity with— all the efforts taken to eliminate it. In fact, all member nations should be required to contribute to the collective effort needed to see off the threat. All of us should be required to do our bit in strengthening our collective defense.

The worst thing NATO can do, apart from doing nothing, is to allow its members to continue regarding the organization as nothing more than a forum in which they are permitted to make disparate and intermittent commitments; that is to say, a NATO à la carte. And the same applies to the logic that regards the Alliance as simply a box of tools from which the members can borrow whatever they need when the moment arises. This would mean sustaining a situation that is no longer sustainable.
We are convinced that if NATO wishes to be an effective tool for improving collective security in this age of vulnerability and terror, it must take a qualitative leap forward in order to become an Alliance for Freedom, one that can defeat terrorism and contain the risks implicit in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile developments. If this demands a new structure and even a new geometry, then so be it. Anything else would mean closing our eyes to the future.
CONCLUSIONS

In this report we are in favor of placing the war against Islamic jihadism at the center of the Allied strategy. And in so far as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction increases the terrorist threat, we are also in favor of promoting the Allied counter-proliferation strategy. Nothing is more lethal in the environment in which we now live than a terrorist armed with radiological, biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.

Whether we like it or not, the only meaning of NATO today is that of defeating Islamist extremism. The organization can either accept this fact or reject the idea and devote its efforts to all kinds of activities while it still can. However, the threat of Islamic terrorism will end up becoming the greatest priority sooner or later. However, it will then only be possible to confront it at a much greater cost. If there is something the Allies have learned from recent history, it is that standing up to our enemies as soon as possible is the best way of eliminating their destructive potential.

“NATO must become a veritable Alliance for Freedom, one whose primary objective is to defeat terror. And to this end, this report has made a number of suggestions and proposed a number of practical measures”

This is why we believe that the Alliance should undertake a transformation process that goes beyond the reformist plans currently being considered by NATO headquarters and the governments of its member countries. NATO must become a veritable Alliance for Freedom, one whose primary objective is to defeat terror. And to this end, this report
has made a number of suggestions and proposed a number of practical measures, ranging from a new strategic focus on Islamic terrorism to the expansion of NATO to include countries such as Australia, Japan and Israel. At the same time, we recommend various changes in Allied structures in order to create functional commands.

This report has centered its ideas and proposals on the war on terror, because, as we have just stated, we believe that it is absolutely essential for NATO to defend itself from this threat. However, although the organization should make this its main task, we also recognize that the Alliance should be open to other activities as well.

NATO’s agenda was inherited from the Cold War period and the post-Cold War era and it should continue to develop this agenda now, encompassing its expansion towards the East and the former Soviet republics and its stabilization of the Balkans. The Alliance cannot forget its commitments in these areas.

However, this inherited agenda cannot place the current strategic agenda in jeopardy due to lack of attention or resources, and the current agenda is to defeat terrorism. Supporting peace in the former Yugoslavia will mean nothing if Islamist extremism defeats us both within and outside our borders, placing our own way of life and existence in danger.

NATO, as described in this report, is ill-prepared to fight and defeat Islamic terrorism because it continues to be anchored in the strategic situations of the past. NATO must transform itself into an Alliance for Freedom, willing and able to collectively secure our liberties, democracies, values and way of life before it is too late.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>The North Atlantic Treaty is signed.</td>
<td>The Treaty establishes the North Atlantic Council (NAC).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tense East-West relations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The possibility of a Soviet attack on Europe grows.</td>
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<td>1952</td>
<td>Lisbon Council: NATO force objectives approved</td>
<td>Civilian bodies are reorganized and the NAC is set up permanently in Paris, plus two new commands in the military structure.</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>Three Wise Men Report on NATO non-military cooperation.</td>
<td>The role of the Secretary General is strengthened.</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>Following the launch of Sputnik, the threat reaches the USA, which proposes European adoption of nuclear weapons.</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>USA begins to consider a flexible response strategy for the first time.</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>Harmel Report on future Alliance Tasks.</td>
<td>NATO undertakes a far-reaching process of transformation and modernization, both in terms of its political stance and its foreign projection.</td>
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### Strategic Modifications

- **Strategic Concept** is developed for the defence of the North Atlantic Area. Large-scale operations strategy developed for the defence of NATO territory.

- **A new military doctrine is formulated:** Containment of Communism.

- Development of the strategy of massive retaliation, with the emphasis on nuclear deterrence. Doctrine of mutual destruction.

- **Emphasis on the political field.** We might highlight the chapter relating to political cooperation, by which it is agreed that any future decisions to be implemented shall be discussed jointly, in order to avoid unilateral decisions that could be detrimental to other Member Countries of the Alliance.

- **In 1962 McNamara admits** that the strategy of massive retaliation has little credibility due to technological changes. Need for a single chain of command within the nuclear field.

- **CHANGE:** Flexible response as opposed to mutual destruction: this is based on a combination of tactical and strategic conventional and nuclear weapons.

### External Threat

- The Lisbon objectives are modified: high budgetary cost, reduced level of belligerence on the part of USSR, US nuclear rearmament and emergence of tactical weapons.

- The Suez Crisis highlights the area “outside NATO's sphere of influence”.

- The USSR increases its nuclear capacity.

- Deployment of joint Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile bases in Europe: only Great Britain ascribes to the idea.

### Internal Divergences

- Containment raises the possibility of the GDR's political and military participation. Opposition from France.

- Internal crisis: European Defence Community.

- The Europeans are not convinced, since their territory would necessarily be the battleground. Enormous effort to balance conventional forces. De Gaulle presents a report .... The French retire from the military structure in 1966.

- Cruise missiles with Pershing II nuclear war-heads are deployed in Europe. Popular opposition in the GDR.
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Proposal by Helmut Schmidt, the German Chancellor.</td>
<td>Proposal by Helmut Schmidt, the German Chancellor.</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>Deployment of a protective shield on American soil, which ceases to be vulnerable.</td>
<td>Deployment of a protective shield on American soil, which ceases to be vulnerable.</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Period of reflection within the Alliance that results in NATO’s New Strategic Concept.</td>
<td>Period of reflection within the Alliance that results in NATO’s New Strategic Concept.</td>
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<td>Balkans</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>NATO passes from being a joint defence organization for its members to a body that ensures security.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-97</td>
<td>NATO expansion.</td>
<td>The strategic objectives of expansion are to overcome the division of Europe that took place during the Cold War, to consolidate democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and to make the Alliance the cornerstone of a new Pan-European security structure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Modifications</td>
<td>External Threat</td>
<td>Internal Divergences</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Soviets undertake a significant modernization programme for their medium-range nuclear weapons. Deployment of new SS-20 missiles.</td>
<td>Rising international tension: Iran and Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Solution: to deploy a series of new medium-range nuclear weapons and open talks with Moscow in order to limit the mutual deployment of these systems. Decision adopted by the Council in 1979, which raises controversy.</td>
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<td>Doctrine of Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA), which entails extensive modernization of NATO's military apparatus.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Friction due to Reagan's initiative within the Allied camp, given that the link between European and American soil would be broken.</td>
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<td>Operations go beyond the sphere of joint defence, aimed at ensuring peace and stability. Obsolete military defence system.</td>
<td>NATO faces new challenges and uncertainties.</td>
<td>Reduction of Allied armed forces.</td>
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<td>Intervention outside NATO territory.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNO provides legitimisation. Peace missions require a doctrine for the employment of force that is not encompassed by the Flexible Response; a different military dimension is required.</td>
<td>A fundamental aspect of this integration process is the high cost of expanding command and control systems, communications and air defence systems...</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Washington Summit.</td>
<td>A new Strategic Concept is adopted that encompasses the majority of risks.</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>September 11th terrorist attacks.</td>
<td>NATO invokes Article 5 of the Treaty one day after the terrorist attacks. The strategic environment appears to be radically altered.</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Prague Summit.</td>
<td>New members and new command structures and forces to address new threats.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Iraq War.</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>March meeting of a Defence Mini-Summit.</td>
<td>France and Germany, supported by Belgium and Luxembourg, launch an initiative to enable Europe to achieve independent military capability outside NATO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Drastic reform of the command structures and military concept of NATO’s RRF.</td>
<td>Command structures are reduced by half. SACEUR extends its sphere of responsibility to the Atlantic Ocean and becomes the only strategic headquarters endowed with operational responsibilities. SACLANT loses its operational functions and becomes Allied Command Transformation.</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Istanbul Summit.</td>
<td>The aim is to strengthen the role of the international Trans-Atlantic community of democratic nations, based on their shared values.</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>The German Chancellor proposes the creation of a Committee of Wise Men (similar to the one that was set up in 1952) to study the matter of reforming the Atlantic Alliance, in order to enable NATO to respond to the new political-strategic realities of our time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Modifications</td>
<td>External Threat</td>
<td>Internal Divergences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reflection regarding the role that NATO should play in the battle against international terrorism.</td>
<td>International terrorism emerges as a considerable threat. Lord Robertson states that, within the context of an environment characterized by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Russia forms part of the security solution rather than representing the security problem.</td>
<td>Paul Wolfowitz states that “the mission determines the coalition” (USA assumes that it will have to rely on a different coalition for each mission. Have permanent alliances ceased to be useful? Intense strategic debate. Europeans claim that the United States is veering towards a unilateral approach. Following the terrorist attacks, Henry Kissinger states that the tragedy could represent a new opportunity for NATO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The flexible response doctrine is required to be more flexible than ever, adapting to combat terrorism and organized crime. Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) are created.</td>
<td>What is the true extent of terrorism?</td>
<td>Americans and Europeans interpret the threat of international terrorism differently.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creation of a central body for joint planning. Creation of NATO Headquarters.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany and France attempt to prevent NATO from strengthening the security situation in Turkey. A profound crisis emerges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The global operations concept of the future FRR is approved. A more flexible and deployable military structure.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Controversy in Europe and unease in the United States and at NATO.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NATO slightly increases its commitment in Iraq. Progress in Afghanistan.</td>
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SOME CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE OCCASION OF
NATO’S 60th ANNIVERSARY

Addendum to the report
NATO: An Alliance for Freedom
INTRODUCTION

In April of this year, 2009, the Atlantic Alliance celebrates its 60th anniversary. The representatives of the 26 allied nations can only congratulate themselves for the long life of the organization as well as for its historical achievements. However, the members of NATO, 60 years after signing the Washington Treaty, are confronting a strategic situation where, at the beginning of the 21st century, they must face diverse challenges from forces that threaten the peace of our existence and from some whose goal is to put an end to our way of life.

In 2005 we published the report NATO: An Alliance for Freedom where we presented our ideas on how, in our opinion, NATO should be transformed in order to be relevant in the new strategic landscape after the 9/11 attacks. We saw that new threats had arisen in the strategic environment such as terrorism, especially jihadist based, and proliferation. These threats demanded a new NATO orientation, more focused on defense against terrorism with a strong Homeland Security component. We also believed that the Alliance, in its role as a coalition of the world’s main democratic nations must take on the task of democracy building in its operations and must move forward in its expansion to include those democracies able and willing to contribute to the collective defense. All of this should be reflected in a new Strategic Concept which would include all of these changes. We also considered that the Alliance should adopt new principles to benefit from a more efficient decision making process.

Although the Alliance has since evolved in the right direction the adaptation has been slower than the changes that have taken place in the strategic environment. Even so, we believe that NATO has the means to satisfactorily face the new threats and challenges. Its members simply need to be able to develop a strategic, forward-looking vision for the Alliance itself.
THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Today we can state that the jihadist threat has been relatively contained thanks to numerous factors. Thanks to strategic pressure in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to constant vigilance and prevention by intelligence services and security forces, large scale attacks have not been repeated on any allied country's soil. The growing number of arrests related to jihadist terrorism in Europe and the United States, as well as the significant number of frustrated attacks, reveal that the jihadist threat has been transformed, but it is far from disappearing. Moreover, the bloodiest jihadist attacks are taking place precisely in Islamic societies and their goal is to wipe out any attempt at openness, liberalization and democracy in those countries.

Along with the persistence of jihadism, new risk factors have appeared in recent months. In spite of the fact that they are varied in nature, together they represent a serious threat to security and stability.

The bloodiest jihadist attacks are taking place precisely in Islamic societies and their goal is to wipe out any attempt at openness, liberalization and democracy.

On the one hand, Russia has reclaimed its role as a superpower and its recent behavior clashes with the West’s view of how a country should conduct itself in the international arena. Even though the fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the end of a long period of confrontation, the truth is that the expectations created since then have not completely been met and Russia, especially with its conduct in the last few years, has introduced in Europe elements which are pure power politics. Nobody would like to relive the Cold War climate with Moscow that we overcame, but it will not be an easy task for the
allies to find a common stance that will check the most negative aspects of the Kremlin’s foreign actions.

Second, situations in countries like North Korea and, especially Iran, have deteriorated and nuclear proliferation moves ahead in both. In recent years, far from toning down their rhetoric and behavior, Iran has become more radical and aggressive. Even worse, today it is clear that Iran has been working feverishly on a nuclear program whose only logic is to provide them with the nuclear arm. To date, all of the efforts by the international community, from dialog to sanctions, have been unsuccessful in forcing the Iranian regime to abandon its nuclear ambitions. In the absence of other more effective collective measures, it does not seem unreasonable to imagine that Iran will become, sooner than later, a nuclear power. Taking into account the potential implications, a nuclear Iran would represent a profound strategic change which would have a very strong negative effect on security, not only in the Gulf region and the Middle East, but for all of the NATO allies.

Our security, which is the same as saying the future of freedom and democracy, depends on the situation of freedom and democracy in other parts of the world

The proliferation problem does not only affect Iran and North Korea. In the last five years nuclear ambitions seem to have been set loose and today there are a growing number of nations that are preparing or are prepared to become nuclear powers. The cases of India and Pakistan are well known. Syria’s nuclear ambitions were made clear after the Israeli bombing in September 2008 of its nuclear power plant which was then under construction. Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have also shown interest in the nuclear field as did Algeria and Libya in the past.

The control mechanisms introduced by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) through the International Atomic Energy Agency have proved to be insufficient in preventing proliferation in those cases where countries are determined to go down the nuclear path. The risk of them being completely ineffective is higher each day, especially if some high-risk countries make the final leap to
becoming a nuclear power. Regional tensions will be transformed wherever nuclear arms appear and they will bring additional instability and unimaginable risks if a conflict breaks out.

Third, eight years after the 9/11 attacks, global jihadism continues being a threat that, if not adequately fought against, may jeopardize our way of life based on democratic values and an open society. Although the operational capability of Al-Qaeda is currently being questioned, attraction to jihadist terrorism by a considerable number of young Muslims, the persistence of recruiting networks, the ease at which they can be trained, and the ideological-religious commitment to the Jihad could enable a future increase of the radical jihadist threat worldwide.

**NATO should consider Latin America as an essential part of the West capable of making a positive contribution to the defense of the values of democracy and freedom**

Fourth, the rise of populism and anti-Westernism in Latin America paints an ever more complicated picture for the security of all and for the values that NATO defends. The relations between leaders such as Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the growing influence in Latin America of powers that are foreign to its tradition and to the values of democracy and of an open society, and evidence, just recently made public, of multiple connections between some authoritarian regimes in the region and terrorist groups, bear witness to this fact.

The Alliance considers terrorism to be one of the factors that affects the collective security of its members. In order to reinforce the task that the European countries carry out with their own security forces and using the domain of the European Union as a base, NATO should develop a *Homeland Security* component to combat terrorism in a unified and collective way. A collective and transatlantic approximation is essential to winning the fight against jihadist terrorism.
A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

The strategic environment described has aspects that are clearly troubling. In addition, all of the allies are suffering a severe economic crisis which will have serious consequences for investment in security and defense. Nevertheless, the summit of the Alliance’s 60th Anniversary in April 2009 offers several opportunities to give a new strategic direction to NATO. To begin with, there are two aspects that are highly favorable: the promises made by the new administration of the American president, Barack Obama; and the decision that under the political drive of the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, France returns to the allied military structures.

With respect to the United States, president Obama’s new administration has created great hopes on both sides of the Atlantic. Simple gestures such as the need for a new tone in the relationship, announced by vice-president Joseph Biden in the 45th Munich Security Conference, were received by the audience with great hope and as a prelude to a new period for NATO allies.

There are two aspects that are highly favorable: the promises made by the new administration of Obama; and the decision that France returns to the allied military structures

Although it is early to judge a foreign and security policy which is still being defined, some of the ideas put forth by the new American president and his closest collaborators have pleased the Europeans. If this good climate and reciprocal attitude is cultivated, NATO could move toward a basic agreement regarding the threats to the allies and the best way to defend themselves from them. That is, to redefine the common vision regarding the nature and purpose of the Alliance, how to achieve its objectives and with what means.
With regard to France, president Nicolas Sarkozy has made a decided bid to return his country to NATO’s integrated military structures in a break with years of French exceptionalism in the Alliance. The importance of this step is not limited to operational or military issues. Its importance is only fully appreciated in the political and strategic domain: NATO needs more than ever to have one single strategic vision. France’s return to NATO’s military structure is not just a question of filling positions in the military command and should not be measured on that basis. NATO will be reinforced, without a doubt with this return.

THE OBSTACLE OF AFGHANISTAN

In recent years, Afghanistan has become a strategic problem which threatens NATO’s own viability and its future. To begin with, the amount of forces deployed in Afghanistan has turned out to be completely insufficient to fulfill the mission of guaranteeing security. And without security, reconstruction is not possible. In spite of the fact that the problem was quickly identified, the allied nations have been reluctant to make an additional effort. In 2004, when the Secretary General called for an increase in the number of soldiers in the ISAF, only Poland responded positively. And at the Bucharest summit, only France decided to reinforce its contingent with a thousand soldiers more. At the end of last year, president Bush decided to increase American troops by two brigades. This decision has been maintained by president Obama who, in fact, may send two more brigades to Afghanistan before the summer. In total, this would mean approximately 17,000 additional troops.

Difficulties to bolster the number of ISAF forces increased as insurgents of all kinds –Taliban, warlords, opium traffickers–, stepped up the number of attacks and, therefore, the number of casualties in the allied troops. In addition, the increase in attacks did not affect everyone equally since the most violent and well organized ones had a greater effect on the eastern and southern areas of the country with the rest being left out of the harshest confrontations. Unfortunately, the restrictive interpretation of the tasks assigned to the ISAF created a clear and divisive difference between those who worked on reconstruction and those who should not only repel attacks but effectively combat them.
Success in Afghanistan is an indispensable condition for revitalizing NATO and consolidating a fruitful relationship between the allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

NATO cannot fail in its mission in Afghanistan. But success in that mission requires putting an end to the differences among the allies and, consequently, the European nations must make a bigger effort. Success in Afghanistan is an indispensable condition for revitalizing NATO and consolidating a fruitful relationship between the allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

**HOW TO IMPROVE NATO: AN ACTION PLAN**

The future of freedom and democracy, as well as allied security, needs a strong and renewed NATO. The Atlantic Alliance has not only played an essential role in ensuring our security for decades and increasing the area of stability in the world, but it should also—as a collective defense organization—occupy a prominent position in preserving future global security. To do so it must adapt to the needs of the new strategic environment.

Following are our proposals for the future of NATO.

1. **Afghanistan. A strategy for victory**

In the first place, it is impossible to consider victory in Afghanistan with the current level of forces. The new American administration understands this. Additional effort, in terms of soldiers and equipment, is also needed from the European allies. The United States can lead the way, but it must not be the only country that significantly increases its troops and assumes the risks of combat. Moreover, the forces available to ISAF should be freed from the limitations that make planning and execution of the allied strategy difficult.
The Afghan problem cannot be resolved by acting only within the borders of Afghanistan. The borders of both Iran and Pakistan should be watched and controlled. Afghanistan will not be stabilized as long as insurgents find refuge and logistical and rearguard support in wide areas of Pakistan. Defining and developing an allied policy that supports Islamabad in its fight against terrorism within its territory and democratic reinforcing of its institutions is crucial.

Success of the NATO mission will be measured by the viability of a central government and a political system in Afghanistan based on plurality and tolerance.

2. Russia: dialog and strength

The Alliance should steer clear of provocations and avoid a new Cold War climate with Russia. But at the same time they should make clear that decisions that affect their activities and their future cannot be hostage to the Kremlin’s wishes. Members of the Alliance, taken individually, may be fragile compared to the Russian giant, particularly the Europeans due to their energy dependence. Therefore, the elaboration of a common policy on how to act with regard to Russia is urgent. This should be based on two criteria: dialog and strength.

The Alliance has not been, nor can it be, and end in itself, but an instrument at the service of the free world

It has been shown that you can talk and reach important agreements better with Moscow from a position of strength than from a position of weakness. The relationship between NATO and Russia should be constructive. Everyone is interested in Moscow acting normally, as a nation which respects international regulations.

We believe it is possible to reach an understanding between the allies and Russia based on common security interests such as the fight against jihadist terrorism or proliferation. It is also evident that this climate of understanding would have been easier to achieve if the error of accepting Kosovo’s independence, and thereby going against the principles of international law, had not been made.
3. Iran: stopping proliferation

To date NATO has avoided playing an active role in stopping the Iranian nuclear program. The Alliance must change its attitude, because if Iran is successful in equipping itself with nuclear arms the security of all of its members will suffer. Iran should, therefore, be in the center of the allies’ concerns and deliberations and, as such, should be on the North Atlantic Council agenda.

It would be advisable for NATO to reinforce its deterrent capacity. On the one hand, it should study the best way to defend itself from ballistic missiles. In this sense, some recent initiatives related to missile defense systems could send a mixed message which may cause undesired reactions both in Moscow and Tehran. If done unilaterally it could also damage the necessary trust among the allies.

We defend an Atlantic Alliance which includes nations such as Japan, Australia and Israel

On the other hand, it would be desirable to extend its deterrent capacity in the region. In this respect, and as stated in this report NATO: An Alliance for Freedom, we believe that the best way to achieve this is with the incorporation of Israel into the alliance and, in any event, to strengthen the institutional ties with that country. Israel’s security and Western security cannot be uncoupled.

4. Defeating terrorism

Protecting the territory has been one of the Alliance’s main tasks throughout its existence. Many believe that with the fall of the Berlin Wall a credible, direct and substantial threat to allied soil disappeared. In the 90s, the Alliance changed its strategy in order to project stability through expeditionary forces and neglected the central concept of collective defense.

Today, however, the possibility of an attack against an ally on its own soil is beginning to look real. This attack will probably come from a terrorist group and, more specifically, from global jihadism.
Eight years after 9/11, the Alliance still does not have a collective and transatlantic intelligence framework focused on radical Islamism. In recent years, the security forces and the justice systems of individual nations have been first and foremost in dealing with the terrorist threat. The European Union has had a growing part in the coordination of its members, although for many there is still much space for improvement in this field.

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Regardless of the necessary cooperation between the European Union and the United States, NATO should define a transatlantic Homeland Defense and Security policy which joins both sides of the Atlantic. Institutional involvement of those responsible of homeland security from the different nations should be a key component.

5. Providing the Alliance with a single strategic vision

NATO’s 60th anniversary summit should serve to launch the process for the creation of a new Strategic Concept which substitutes the one created in 1999. NATO also needs a more general declaration regarding its current status and purpose, especially in light of important changes such as the new American administration and France’s greater commitment to the Alliance. The allies could work in the creation of a new Atlantic Declaration as an expression of what NATO is, of what it should be, and the renewed commitment of all of its members.

The Alliance should avoid two temptations. First, attempting to steer its functions towards areas that are fashionable, but where it has no experience or where it has very little to offer. The Alliance should concentrate on what it knows how to do and where its presence has indisputable added value. For example, in the area of energy, NATO can make a contribution to the protection of infrastructures or keeping communication lines and transportation open. Its contribution could also be crucial in areas where nobody could do it better, such as defense against computer attacks or protection of sea traffic from piracy.
The second temptation would be to enclose itself in a comfortable geographical framework. The world is global and security depends on global forces. In any case, NATO needs regional pillars on which to rest in order to have a positive impact on world security.

6. Promoting democratic values and order

If there is something that characterizes NATO it is being an Alliance of the Civilized. In terms of democratic and plural political culture; in terms of free market economy; and in terms of religious tolerance and openness to ideas. Unfortunately, the world is not only made up of open and free countries. Sometimes democracy advances with enormous difficulty.

If we have learned anything in the last few years it is that our security, which is the same as saying the future of freedom and democracy, depends on the situation of freedom and democracy in other parts of the world. International stability and security are threatened, especially by forces that want to put an end to those values. NATO needs to keep in mind that the increase in autocracies and radicalism ends up becoming threats to global security. Therefore, it is also necessary to keep the Agenda for Freedom alive, as a proposal for extending freedom and democracy. Achieving this is a requirement for consolidating global security.

7. The case for a global NATO

In NATO, an Alliance for Freedom, we defend an Atlantic Alliance which includes nations such as Japan, Australia and Israel. South Korea should also be added to these nations. Establishing strategic partnerships with India and Colombia is also supported. Since then, the Alliance has established links with many of these countries according to their participation in missions under way at the time. NATO has established an individual cooperation agreement with Israel that sets the foundation for a closer operational relationship. Israel has, in fact, become part of the Active Endeavor mission. More recently, the United
States has signed a highly promising strategic cooperation agreement with India, which NATO could take as an example.

There is no reason why Iraq could not be a part of the new Partnership for Peace of the Alliance

Even so, these steps are not enough. In its own interest, the Alliance should implement an Open Door Strategy that incorporates democracies that wish for closer collaboration with NATO and attracts those that have not yet considered the possibility.

In this respect we propose:

First, expansion of the Alliance to include free democratic powers, regardless of where they are located, provided they want to contribute to collective security and are able to do so. Israel demands special consideration. Israel is a Western nation by rights, due to the values it supports and defends.

Second, reform the Partnership for Peace to make it global and not, as it currently stands, limited to the domain of the OSCE. NATO should consider Latin America as an essential part of the West capable of making a positive contribution to the defense of the values of democracy and freedom, and to global stability and security. In the 2005 report, a strategic partnership with Colombia was already proposed. This proposal is still valid and could be extended to other countries in the region, such as Mexico.

Moreover, if Iraq continues down the path of normalization and democratization which it has fortunately begun, there is no reason why it could not be a part of the new Partnership for Peace of the Alliance. NATO was born to defend the universal values of democracy and freedom. This new NATO must work, as it has been, to defend those values in Arab and Muslim countries which are making an effort to consolidate democratic societies.
CONCLUSION: REINFORCING NATO TO STRENGTHEN THE WEST

NATO was born to defend the security of the democratic world. In the current strategic environment, the allied countries must be aware that security and democracy continue to be inextricably linked. Today, more than ever, the survival of freedom depends on its expansion.

In its 60th anniversary, NATO has the opportunity to set an ambitious vision and to serve as a guarantee of a new international order where there is respect for the principles of tolerance, freedom and democracy for everyone.

Europeans should be aware that if they wish to increase their presence in the world they must take on more responsibilities in the area of security. It is better to have one security than two insecurities. The European security component should, therefore, not take place ignoring NATO. On the contrary, an improved NATO must include a Europe that is stronger and has more responsibilities in that field.

The Alliance has not been, nor can it be, and end in itself, but an instrument at the service of the free world. At present, this requires that this successful alliance not only guarantees security in the Euro-Atlantic region, which is what article 6 of the Washington Treaty states. Neither can it resign itself to guaranteeing stability and peace in third countries. NATO should seriously and bravely consider that the future of the values it defends requires that the Alliance have a global dimension. The best way to defend our security and the values of democracy is a global Alliance for Freedom.
The report *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom* was first published in 2005. It offered proposals to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance in a new strategic environment. NATO’S 60th ANNIVERSARY is a perfect occasion to remember and update those proposals in sight of recent events: Barack Obama’s arrival in office, the steps taken by president Sarkozy, Russia’s political evolution, the constant threat of jihadist terrorism, Iran or North Korea’s persistent nuclear ambitions, and the situation in Afghanistan, are some of the issues analyzed in this new edition of *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom*. The proposals of the original report are still valid: strengthening and reforming NATO are essential requirements to guarantee our security and the future of freedom.